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REPRESENTATION FOR THE POOR IN 
FEDERAL RULEMAKING 
Arthur Earl Bonfield* 
I. THE PROBLEM 
A. Generally 
T HE sound operation of the federal administrative rulemaking system demands that all relevant interests and viewpoints be 
considered prior to the formulation and promulgation of its prod-
uct. Only after such an examination can the responsible officials 
have any confidence in the soundness of the rules they create. Officials 
engaged in rulemaking for the federal government are usually ap-
prised of the various interests and viewpoints deserving consideration 
in that process by representatives of individuals affected by their 
actions. 
The ample personal economic resources and relatively well-fi-
nanced organizations of middle and upper income Americans usu-
ally assure their particular interests adequate representation in 
federal administrative rulemaking. The norm is that middle and 
upper income individuals, or their personal or organizational rep-
resentatives, directly or indirectly monitor all agency activities. 
These persons attempt to protect their interests through formal 
or informal participation in rulemaking affecting them. But fed-
eral rulemaking very frequently affects large numbers of individuals 
who lack the personal economic resources and organized associations 
of middle and upper income Americans. These economically under-
privileged persons are usually unable to keep themselves adequately 
informed of the numerous actual or proposed exercises of rulemaking 
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This Article is based upon a report prepared under the auspices of the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States. The Conference, however, does not in any 
way approve it or evaluate its content, which is the sole responsibility of the author. 
Official recommendations made by the Conference on this subject may be found in 
Appendix B of this Article. Those specific recommendations are the only statements 
attributable to the Administrative Conference of the United States with respect to 
representation for the poor in federal rulemaking. The Administrative Conference of 
the United States [see 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-76 (1964)] was established by Congress in 1964 to 
study the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of federal administrative practices and 
procedures. It is specifically empowered to make recommendations to the President, 
the Congress, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the executive depart-
ments and administrative agencies for improvements in those procedures by which the 
administrative bodies of our national government determine private rights and 
obligations. 
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authority affecting their interests. Normally the poor are also unable 
to communicate effectively to the appropriate authority their views 
about proposed rules, or to petition in their own interest for new 
rules or for the amendment or repeal of old rules. 
An agency promulgating rules affecting the poor cannot assume 
that it automatically knows what is best for such people. Govern-
ment administrators are usually persons with middle-class back-
grounds, experiences, and associations; therefore, they tend to have 
middle-class viewpoints, orientations, and understandings. This 
means that the personnel of federal agencies may be expected to 
reflect more accurately the interests of the affluent than those of 
the economically underprivileged. Consequently, there is a special 
reason for concern when, as is now the case, the interests of poor 
people are inadequately represented in the rulemaking process. 
The administration of government undoubtedly suffers as a 
whole from the inability of the economically underprivileged seg-
ment of our society to represent adequately its group interests in 
the rulemaking process. The inability of the poor in this respect 
is injurious to the government's sound administration because it 
sometimes results in the formulation and promulgation of policy 
without consideration of all the relevant viewpoints. Recent re-
sponses of the poor to the product of such an improperly functioning 
process have been expensive, time-consuming, and unfortunately, 
too often destructive. Ill-considered rules have frequently caused 
litigation, civil disobedience, and on occasion, riot. Some of this 
might have been avoided if the views of the poor were considered 
in the initial formulation of agency policies affecting them. 
This conclusion does not ignore the many well-intentioned and 
often considerable efforts of the appropriate officials to ascertain, 
by their own investigations, the views of the economically under-
privileged concerning administrative rulemaking that affects them. 
But available evidence establishes that these official efforts have 
been insufficient to compensate for the inability of the poor affirm-
atively to represent their own interests in rulemaking. The fact is 
that government administrators are too often inadequately apprised 
of the poor's views respecting the desirability of existing or pro-
posed rules. 
B. General Summary of the Evidence 
Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the poor of 
our society have been inadequately represented in federal rulemak-
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ing. Some original data on this subject was obtained from a ques-
tionnaire entitled "Survey of Participation of the Poor in Agency 
Rulemaking of Particular Interest to the Poor" distributed to some 
forty federal agencies during the summer of 1968.1 
Each federal agency surveyed was asked the following initial 
question: 
I. What programs does your department or agency administer 
a. that are directed primarily at the economically underprivileged 
segments of our society, or, 
b. although not directed primarily at such segments, may have 
a very substantial impact on them? 
Most agencies listed those programs under their respective juris-
dictions reasonably falling within the above categories. However, 
the questionnaire responses indicated that a few agencies admin-
istering programs in class (l)(b) above do not recognize that they 
are in fact doing so. That is, even though they are administering 
some programs having a very substantial impact on the poor, a sig-
nificant number of agencies replied to question (l)(b) by stating 
that they administered no programs of that type.2 In addition, a few 
I. The following agencies responded to the questionnaire which was distributed 
as a survey of the Rulemaking Co=ittee of the Administrative Conference of the 
United States: Department of Justice; Civil Service Commission; Post Office Depart-
ment; Department of Agriculture; Department of the Interior; Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare; Tennessee Valley Authority; Department of Labor; Office of 
Economic Opportunity; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Federal Power 
Commission; United States Commission on Civil Rights; Small Business Administra-
tion; National Capital Planning Co=ission; Federal Communications Commission; 
Securities and Exchange Commission; Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the 
United States; National Science Foundation; National Advisory Council on the Educa-
tion of Disadvantaged Children; Smithsonian Institution; President's Council on 
Youth Opportunity; Department of State; Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority; Department of the Treasury; General Services Administration; Appalachian 
Regional Commission; Interstate Commerce Commission; Farm Credit Administration; 
Federal Reserve System; Veterans Administration; Federal Home Loan Bank Board; 
Department of Commerce; Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
2. The following examples are illustrative: 
"Concerning the study that your Committee on Rulemaking is making of participa-
tion of the poor in agency rulemaking .•• [the U.S. Civil Service Co=ission is] 
declining to attempt to fill out the questionnaire because we do not believe it is 
applicable to us.'' Yet that body makes the general rules for government hiring and 
classification of employees, and it administers nondiscrimination in government 
employment [under Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 §§ 103, 104 (1965)]. 
"Please be advised that the General Services Administration does not appear to 
have programs of the nature contemplated by the Survey of Participation of the Poor 
in Agency Rulemaking.'' Yet many of the programs administered by this agency 
undoubtedly fit within class (l)(b) of the question in the text since the manner and 
conditions under which the national government purchases and sells supplies and 
property and cares for and constructs federal buildings undoubtedly has a substantial 
impact on the poor. 
"This is in reply to your letter of July 18 which requested responses to a survey 
questionnaire dealing with programs administered by (the Post Office] Department 
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agencies that did list some programs having a substantial impact 
on the poor neglected to list all of their programs fitting into that 
category.3 If the agencies involved do not understand that some of 
their programs have a substantial impact on the poor, or cannot 
determine which of their programs have that effect and which do 
not, the interests of such persons are inadequately represented in 
rulemaking for those programs. 
The questionnaire also asked the agencies surveyed: 
5. Does your agency now attempt to ascertain the views of poor and 
economically underprivileged persons in respect to rules and 
policies proposed to be issued to implement the programs listed 
in response to question I above? If so, please describe in detail 
the procedures you use in each program to ascertain these views. 
About one third of the agencies claiming to administer programs 
substantially affecting the poor indicated that they had not previ-
ously attempted to ascertain the views of economically underprivi-
which are directed at or have a very substantial impact on the poor. The Department 
does not administer any such programs. Our primary activity, moving the mail, and 
our programs to effect that end, are not directed at any economic group and do not 
have the impact on the poor contemplated by your questionnaire." Yet the Post Office 
is one of the largest actual or potential government employers of "poor" people. Its 
part-time hiring during Christmas, for example, has a substantial impact on the poor. 
In addition, whether it delivers mail on five or six days a week may have a qualita-
tively greater impact on the poor than on others. If the poor cannot get their welfare 
or social security checks on time because mail is delivered only five days a week, they 
have no other resources to fall back. on. 
3. The following examples are illustrative. 
While the Department of Labor lists enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964)] implemented by regulations found in 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 31 (1968), it does not list its role as implementor of Executive Order No. 11,246, 30 
Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965). The former program is to effectuate the policy of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 that no person shall, on the ground of race, color, etc. be excluded 
from participation in or discriminated against in any program receiving federal 
financial assistance from the Department of Labor, while the latter is a program ad-
ministered by that Department to assure nondiscrimination in employment by gov-
ernment contractors and subcontractors. In addition, while the Department of Labor 
does list the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963, 7 U.S.C. § 2041 (1964), 
implemented by regulations found in 29 C.F.R. pt. 40 (1968), it does not list as a program 
substantially affecting the poor the bracero program partially administered by that 
department under 20 C.F.R. § 602.10 (1968). The former program requires certain 
persons to obtain certificates of registration prior to performing any activities which 
constitute engagement in farm labor contracting, while the latter requires that the 
Secretary of Labor certify certain facts as a condition for the admission o'.' aliens to 
perform certain temporary agricultural or logging industry services. 
While the Department of Agriculture lists many programs it administers ,,aving a 
substantial impact on the poor it does not list the price support and proiuction 
stabilization programs administered by the Commodity Credit Corporation and the 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. Also omitted from the Depart-
ment's enumeration of its programs having a substantial impact on the poor are the 
Rural Electrification Administration programs and Federal Extension Service pro-
grams. See 1968-69 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 273-77, 283, 294. 
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leged persons with respect to rules and policies proposed by the 
agencies to implement those programs. A typical response of this 
kind stated that "We do not now attempt to ascertain the views of 
the poor and economically underprivileged, as such."4 
About two thirds of the agencies reporting that they adminis-
tered programs substantially affecting the poor stated that they had 
made some efforts to ascertain the views of those people with re-
spect to rulemaking for such programs. In most cases, however, 
the efforts described are totally inadequate for the purpose. They 
are frequently haphazard, unsystematic, and sporadic.5 The means 
used have sometimes been so informal and unstructured as to 
achieve the result only incidentally and accidentally if at all.6 Fur-
thermore, agencies frequently seem to have sought information 
about the views of the poor from persons who are neither poor nor 
reliable spokesmen for the mass of the poor affected by those agen-
cies' actions.7 The answers to question 5 also indicate that very few 
4. Veterans Administration. Responses of a significant number of other agencies 
were similar. The following examples are illustrative: 
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board reported that it "makes no special provision 
to secure the views of poor persons." The Tennessee Valley Authority simply answered 
question 5 "No." "The (Federal Power] Commission does not make an overt effort to 
solicit the advice of the poor as such •••• " "The Department [of Transportation] 
does not, by regulation, specifically, attempt to ascertain the views of the poor in 
regulatory activities listed in paragraph l." "The views of poor and economically 
underprivileged persons have not been actively solicited (by the Federal Reserve 
System] in respect to rules and policies regarding the program mentioned in lb, 
above • • • ." "There is no regular procedure in effect whereby the views of the poor 
are obtained in connection with the issuance of policies and procedures" of the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development. 
Many of the above responses do, however, go on and assert specifically that this 
does not mean that the interests and views of the poor are ignored with respect to 
that portion of the agency's policy-making which affects them. 
5. The following examples are illustrative: 
For three out of the five programs reported by the Small Business Administration 
as having a substantial impact on the poor, it answered question 5 "No." While it 
claimed to make an effort to ascertain the views of the poor with respect to some 
programs, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare reported that it did not 
make a specific attempt to solicit regularly the views of the poor as such with respect 
to rulemaking for the Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance Programs and the 
Social and Rehabilitation Services Programs. The Department of Agriculture reported 
that it "has not heretofore, on its own initiative attempted to ascertain the views of 
poor and economically underprivileged persons in respect to rules and policies pro-
posed to be issued to implement the listed (food distribution] programs," but it has 
attempted to do so with respect to programs administered by the Farmers Home 
Administration. 
6. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reported that 
"(o]ur agency ascertains the views of economically underprivileged persons in respect 
to rules and policies informally insofar as these views are elicited in the course of 
investigation of charges of unlawful practices." 
7. For example, the Department of Agriculture reported that it ascertains the 
views of the poor with respect to programs administered by the Farmers Home Ad-
ministration (FHA) from its Technical Action Panels, County FHA Committees, and 
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of those agencies stating that they attempt to ascertain the views 
of the poor make any consistent efforts to do so through means 
specifically and specially tailored to accomplish that result in a re-
liable way. For example, some agencies claimed that they attempted 
to ascertain the views of the poor by issuing general public invita-
tions to all interested people, including the poor, to submit their 
views upon particluar rules proposed by the agency.8 
Responses to a further question are also instructive because they 
indicate that, in fact, the interests of the poor have rarely had any 
continuous and systematic affirmative representation in the federal 
rulemaking process. That question asked: 
7. Have any particular groups or organizations intervened or other-
wise participated for the purpose of representing the views of the 
poor in rulemaking or in proposing rules in connection with any 
of these programs? If so, please identify the groups or organiza-
tions and indicate the frequency of such participation and the 
method by which each such group or organization has par-
ticipated. 
About half of the responses from agencies acknowledging that they 
administered programs substantially affecting the poor indicated 
State FHA Advisory Committees. Yet these bodies rarely if ever have members who are 
poor persons themselves, that is, members "of the poor"; and these bodies rarely have 
adequate representatives of the poor's views as such among their membership. Some 
Technical Action Panels may have the Directors of local Community Action Program 
(CAP) organizations and welfare agencies among their number. But these officials do 
not necessarily represent the views of the mass of the poor since their CAP or welfare 
agency positions are controlled by the establishment, they are not themselves poor, 
and frequently their outlook may be middle-class• and establishment-oriented. This 
is especially true with respect to the Directors of CAP programs since the Green 
Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2790 (Supp. III, 1965·1967), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2790 (1964). 
In addition, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reported that: 
The Social Security Administration [with respect to Medicare) consults with 
the Health Insurance Benefit Advisory Counsel, a panel of 19 persons outstanding 
in fields related to hospital, medical and health activities, on matters of general 
policy and in the formulation of regulations. The panel includes representatives of 
public and private medicine, hospitals, nursing homes, health insurance, labor, 
and the general public. The poor, as such, are not represented on the panel-
the public, as such, is represented on the panel. 
Obviously, attempts to ascertain accurately the views of the poor from these people 
are not likely to be very successsful. 
8. For example, the Department of Labor reported: 
When notice of proposed rulemaking is given, the Department of Labor invites 
every interested person to submit written data, views or argument, and, when an 
opportunity is provided for oral presentations, to farticipate orally. Special notice 
is customarily given labor unions where interest o their members is involved. 
And the Federal Trade Commission reported that it attempts to ascertain the views of 
the poor "through building up of public records contributed by members and repre-
sentatives of all sectors of the economy and through the holding of public hearings in 
some cases." According to the questionnaire responses, no special effort seems to be made 
by these two agencies to notify the poor or solicit their views as distinguished from 
the public generally. Certainly the unions are not adequate representatives of the poor's 
interests before the Department of Labor. 
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that no particular groups or organizations had intervened or other-
wise participated in their rulemaking for this purpose.9 An addi-
tional number of respondents indicated that outside organizations 
had participated, on behalf of the poor, in agency rulemaking for 
some programs substantially affecting such people, but not at all 
in the rulemaking for other such programs.10 
According to the responses received to another interrogatory 
contained in the questionnaire, the present situation is not likely 
to change very much without external stimulation. The agencies 
were asked: 
6. Does your agency contemplate using any particular means not 
utilized at the present time by it to insure that the views of the 
poor are adequately ascertained prior to the promulgation of any 
rule intended to implement or affect these programs? I£ so, please 
explain in detail. 
A number of very important agencies from the point of view of 
the poor indicated that they intended to institute new and more 
effective means by which to ascertain the views of the poor with 
respect to rulemaking substantially affecting those people.11 How-
ever, most agency respondents indicated that they had no such plans, 
and that they were satisfied with their present efforts in this re-
gard.12 
In addition to the responses gleaned from the questionnaire dis-
tributed to the various federal government agencies, other evidence 
directly or indirectly supports the proposition that the interests of 
9. For example, the Department of Transportation reported that: "No particular 
groups have intervened or otherwise participated for the purpose of representing the 
views of the poor in rulemaking in this Department"; the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission reported that "[n]o group or organization has formally inter-
vened or participated for the specific purpose of representing the views of the poor 
in rulemaking"; and TVA simply answered question 7, "No." 
10, For example, the Small Business Administration reported that no groups par-
ticipated to represent the poor in rulemaking for any of its programs except the 
Economic Opportunity Loan Program, where many groups have participated for this 
purpose. Similarly, the Department of Agriculture reported that for food distribution 
programs, some groups had participated, but for Farmers Home Administration pro-
grams, "[t]he answer to this 'question is in the negative." 
11. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Agri-
culture (but only in regard to consumer food programs), and the Department of Labor 
reported such plans. 
12. For example, the Veterans' Administration stated that: "[w]e have no plan at 
present to use any particular means other than those explained above, to insure that 
the needs of the poor veterans, as such, are ascertained prior to the promulgation of 
rules." The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reported that: "[o]ur agency 
does not at present contemplate utilization of other means to insure that the views 
of the poor are ascertained prior to promulgation of rules." And the Small Business 
Administration and Tennessee Valley Authority both simply replied "No" to ques-
tion 6. 
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the poor have had inadequate representation in federal rulemaking 
important to them. Officials of a number of major organizations 
purporting to represent some segment of the poor were ques-
tioned.13 They indicated that poor people's organizations had only 
rarely participated in federal administrative rulemaking, and then 
only very recently and on an ad hoc basis. The reasons most often 
cited for the failure of the poor to participate more extensively in 
that process were their lack of knowledge that rules of interest to 
them were being considered, their lack of money to finance such 
participation, their lack of knowledge of the means by which they 
could participate, and the relevant agencies' lack of interest in as-
certaining their views. 
The representatives of those poor people's organizations ques-
tioned during this study also made another significant point. They 
insisted that one of the most important deficiencies of the federal 
administrative process is the inability of economically underprivi-
ledged persons to have their views adequately represented in the 
formulation of policies affecting them. In this connection it should 
be noted that the Poor People's Campaign of 1968 specifically and 
repeatedly demanded that there should be greater consultation with 
the poor and greater consideration of their views in the formulation 
of administrative regulations affecting them.14 In responding to these 
13. Among the people questioned, either in person or over the telephone, were 
Clarence Mitchell, NAACP; Cenoria Johnson, Urban League; Tim Sampson, National 
Welfare Rights Organization; Philip Ryan, in the offices of Marian Wright, Counsel to 
the Poor People's Campaign; Steven Rosenfield, Citizens Advocate Center; Norman 
Kurland, Citizens Crusade Against Poverty; and Larry Silver, Neighborhood Legal 
Services Program. All of the above are located in Vvashington, D.C. Also questioned 
were Gary Bellow of the California Rural Legal Assistance Program, McFarland, 
California; Junius Allison of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Chi-
cago; and Leroy Clark, formerly of the NAACP Legal and Educational Defense Fund of 
New York. 
14. For example, the Poor People's Campaign demanded of the Department of 
Labor "[i]nvolvement of the poor in decision making about manpower training and 
other employment programs"; of the Office of Economic Opportunity "that the O.E.O. 
reorder its priorities so that the consumers of services be involved in the policy making 
•.• of those programs which continue to be administered by the agency"; of the De• 
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare (1) "that the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare require of grantees that poor people be included in planning 
bodies under the comprehensive health planning and Medicare programs which 
have provisions for citizen membership on their planning boards" (2) that HEW 
"[e]stablish a national structure and mechanism which provides for continuous input 
by poor black, brown, and white people in the design, development, operation and 
evaluation of all federally funded education programs" and (3) that HEW "requir[e] 
that [welfare] recipients be involved in making policy and program decisions about 
how the program will be carried out by the states and localities." 
The quoted demands may be found in the mimeo sheets entitled "Statement of 
Demands for Rights of the Poor Presented to Agencies of the U.S. Government by 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Its Committee of 100, April 29-30, 
May 1, 1968" presented by the Poor People's Campaign to each of the above agencies. 
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demands, some federal agencies tacitly admitted that the poor had 
been inadequately represented in the formulation of administrative 
policy. Those few agencies stated that they intended to adopt new 
means to enhance the poor's participation in that process.115 This fact 
correlates with the previously reported responses to question 6 of 
the questionnaire. 
The official agency responses to some of the specific substantive 
demands made by the Poor People's Campaign of 1968 may also 
constitute some evidence that the poor have been inadequately 
represented in the federal rulemaking process. After examining 
objections raised by the poor, a number of agencies admitted that 
several of their substantive policies questioned by that Campaign 
were inadequate and should be changed.16 This indicates that these 
15. For example, note that the Department of Health, Education, and ,velfare 
replied to the Poor People's Campaign by stating that (I) "We will increase our efforts 
to involve persons representative of the poor in our activities and on our Advisory 
Committees," (2) "we will establish, and require each state to establish, some vehicle 
for obtaining the advice of the poor, especially recipients in program and policy de-
velopment," and (3) "the Commissioner [of Education] and members of his staff will 
meet with a group of persons broadly representative of the poor and arrange for 
continued participation of such a group with respect to all federally funded education 
programs in the Office of Education"; the Department of Labor responded by stating 
that "[a]dditional efforts to reach and to communicate with the poor must be made 
so that their needs are understood"; and the Office of Economic Opportunity responded 
to the Poor People's Campaign by stating that "[t]he Community Action Program is 
instituting a system by which drafts of major policy instructions will be circulated for 
comment to all grantees and national organizations interested in community action 
before becoming official. Representatives of the poor on C.A.A. boards and advisory 
counsels shall thus have a chance to discuss policy and make their views known to 
O.E.O. before the policy is formally adopted ..•. The O.E.O. will involve the poor as 
consultants in O.E.O. program development." 
The above quotations may be found in the official responses from each of the above 
agencies to the demands of the Poor People's Campaign. Letters to the Reverend 
Ralph Abernathy from Wilbur Cohen, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 
May 25, 1968, and June 18, 1968; from Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, dated May 
27, 1968; from Bertram Harding, Acting Director of OEO, undated and titled "Office 
of Economic Opportunity Response to Poor People's Campaign." 
16. For example, in response to a request for more stringent enforcement of fair 
employment by federal government contractors, the Department of Labor stated that 
it "will issue new guidelines requiring firms holding government contracts to use hiring 
and promotion tests that are racially culturally fair." It also stated that it "will issue 
new regulations to tighten the Labor Department equal opportunity programs," ex-
panding coverage from first level to all levels of subcontractors and requiring positive 
action programs from contractors. Letter from ,vmard ,virtz, Secretary of Labor, 
to the Reverend Ralph Abernathy May 27, 1968. Similarly, in response to a demand 
that health services be made available to poor through comprehensive neighborhood 
health centers, the Department of Health, Education, and ,velfare responded that it 
will pool funds from different sections of HEW and other agencies to support compre-
hensive health services in poor urban and rural areas. And in response to a demand 
that only declarations of facts be required of recipients under federally financed state 
welfare programs the Department promised to institute such a system. For both of 
the above HEW replies, see letter to the Reverend Ralph Abernathy from Wilbur 
Cohen, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare May 25, 1968. Note also that of 
the five high-priority changes in the size, shape, and location of food distribution 
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agencies may not have been properly apprised of the relevant in-
terests of poor people when the administrative decision makers first 
formulated the policies involved. A few officials have privately ad-
mitted that this was the case in some of those situations. (Of course, 
in other of those situations the decision makers may have been 
adequately apprised of the relevant interests of the poor and simply 
made unwise policy decisions. High quality representation of the 
poor's interests in rulemaking cannot invariably assure that admin-
istrators will make wise decisions!) 
Similarly, a number of recent lawsuits may also attest to the inade-
quate representation accorded the poor in the federal rulemaking 
process. These suits indicate, in one way or another, that certain 
federal administrative action or inaction did not properly protect 
the interests of poor people.17 A possible implication may be that 
the interests of the poor were so inadequately represented in those 
agencies' policymaking processes that a lawsuit was required to in-
duce proper protection for the economically underprivileged. 
To all the above evidence may be added the fact that many 
scholars studying the poverty problem agree that the interests of 
the poor are inadequately represented in the rulemaking process. 
Moreover, in some situations the administrative rules or lack of 
administrative rules implementing a particular program affecting 
the poor treat the interests of those people in such a way that the 
poor were not likely to have been properly represented in their 
formulation.18 It should also be recalled, as noted previously, that 
administrative policy makers almost always have middle-class back-
grounds and therefore are not usually personally familiar with, or 
natural advocates for, the interests of the poor. 
programs demanded by the Poor People's Campaign of the Department of Agricul-
ture, four were at least partially met. Des Moines Register, Nov. 16, 1968, at 8, col. 4, 
5; Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1968, at 2, col. 3. 
17. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), holding that the Alabama substitute-
father regulation (which requires disqualification of otherwise eligible children from 
federally supported aid to dependent children if their mother cohabits with a man not 
obligated by Alabama law to provide support) defines "parent" in a manner incon-
sistent with the national Social Security Act and is therefore invalid with respect to 
the program. 392 U.S. at 333 n.4. To the extent HEW approved any man-in-the-house 
provision in state plans that conflicted with the Social Security Act that approval 
was improper because it was inconsistent with the controlling federal act. After King v. 
Smith, HEW issued new regulations outlawing such substitute-father rules. 33 Fed. 
Reg. 11290. In Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967), a tenant in federally 
assisted low rent public housing was given notice of eviction without explanation after 
being elected president of a tenants' organization. The Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment below affirming eviction and remanded for a reassessment of that judgment in 
light of directive issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development after 
grant of certiorari requiring that no tenant be given notice to vacate without reasons 
for eviction and a chance to explain. 
18. See, e.g., Note, Welfare's "Condition X", 76 YALE L.J. 1222 (1967). 
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C. Some Definitions 
In light of the above evidence, a number of specific recommen-
dations with respect to representation for the poor in federal rule-
making seem appropriate. To assure precision, several terms utilized 
in the attached recommendations (see Appendix A) and in the re-
mainder of this Article deserve definition. The words "poor" and 
"economically underprivileged" are used as synonyms. They refer 
to that group in our society unable to represent adequately its col-
lective interests in federal rulemaking because its members lack the 
individual or organizational financial resources to do so. Consistent 
with this definition some groups of individuals may be poor or 
economically underprivileged in relation to certain rulemaking and 
not in relation to other rulemaking. This Article and the accom-
panying recommendations assume that people will be treated as 
poor only in the rulemaking situations where they are unable to 
represent themselves adequately because of their financial incapac-
ity. Depending on the circumstances it is possible, therefore, that 
those who are deemed poor for present purposes may vary to some 
extent with the particular rulemaking involved. 
The "rulemaking" referred to is that defined by section 2(c) of 
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (AP A).19 "Rulemaking" 
therefore means "agency process for the formulation, amendment or 
repeal of a rule." The word "rule" refers to "the whole or any part 
of any agency statement of general or particular applicability and 
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or 
policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice re-
quirements of any agency . . . .''20 
D. The Precise Scope of the Task 
The purpose of the appended recommendations is to assure that 
the interests of the poor in our society are adequately represented 
in all federal rulemaking having a substantial impact on them. In 
doing so, the primary concern is the ability of the economically 
underprivileged to participate in rulemaking both for those pro-
grams directly aimed at them and for those which, although not 
directed at the poor, substantially affect them as a separate group. 
However, the need for adequate poor people's representation in 
rulemaking extends beyond this. Rulemaking for some programs 
thought not to concern the poor and usually not affecting the poor 
may, on occasion, have a large impact on them. Consequently, an 
19. 5 U.S.C. § IO0l(c) (1964), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
20. 5 U.S.C. § l00l(c) (1964), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
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adequate remedy must include a mechanism for monitoring, on be-
half of the poor, all federal rulemaking; and it must assure, insofar as 
practicable, representation for the poor in all rulemaking having a 
substantial impact on them, even though that rulemaking occurs 
in a particular program not normally having that kind of effect. 
The need to secure representation for the poor for all rulemaking 
of this sort is especially critical when it is remembered that rule-
making is frequently not an on-going process. It may be a one-time 
affair resulting in a rule to last for the indefinite future. Failure to 
assure adequate representation for the poor's interests in all rule-
making having a substantial impact on them as a separable group 
may, therefore, have long-term rather than short-term deleterious 
consequences in many situations. 
It would be simple to formulate a nearly perfect solution to 
the problem under consideration if the poor were a monolithic or 
homogeneous group with its own democratically elected representa-
tive structure which could be called upon to articulate the particular 
interests of the poor wherever they were affected. The fact is that no 
organization, group, or individual can rightfully assert that it speaks 
for all the poor of this country in any truly democratic or representa-
tive sense. The poor are too heterogeneous and diverse; their inter-
ests too disparate and fractionalized. Even the sum total of all groups 
or organizations purporting to represent the interests of the Ameri-
can poor do not do so in any really democratic sense since most 
poor people are not members of any such group or organization. 
The interests of the majority of poor may also sometimes diverge 
from the views of the many organized groups purporting to speak 
for some segment of them or for all of them. In addition, the leader-
ship of some so-called "poor people's groups" may fall into the 
hands of persons who are in fact out of touch-or simply not con-
cerned-with reflecting the views and promoting the welfare of the 
mass of the economically underprivileged. For these reasons, the 
creation of a truly representative agent to articulate and represent 
the heterogeneous interests of the poor is both impractical and in-
feasible. Consequently, the most satisfactory means of assuring ade-
quate representation for the poor in federal rulemaking substantially 
affecting their interests will necessarily be imperfect. It also may 
have to be, in at least one sense, artificial and imposed from above. 
Efforts to secure adequate representation for the economically 
underprivileged in all federal rulemaking having a substantial im-
pact on them will have to move on two fronts to be successful. An 
attempt must be made to assure that federal agencies making rules 
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of this kind independently seek to ascertain from the poor their 
views with respect to such rules. In addition, an attempt must be 
made to help the poor obtain affirmative representation for their 
interests in the rulemaking process. That is,. some means must be 
devised by which to assure that these people have a competent, 
consistent, and aggressive advocate for their interests before federal 
agencies. Within the limits set by this two-pronged approach, a 
desirable solution should also be feasible-that is, realistically 
achievable; should take account of the fact that the interests of the 
poor needing representation may often be fractionalized and di-
verse; should be workable in an everyday, operative sense; and should 
be as economical as possible. Moreover, such a solution should be 
practical in the sense that the positive contribution it may make to 
the administrative process should overbalance any negative impact 
it may have on that process or other societal values. A desirable 
resolution of the problem under consideration should also make it 
as obvious as possible to the poor that their views will be adequately 
represented in rulemaking. This particular requirement may not 
directly enhance the proper functioning of the administrative pro-
cess as such. It may, however, help to eliminate that portion of the 
poor's distrust of and dissatisfaction with government which stems 
from their perception that officialdom does not adequately consider 
their views when it makes policy affecting them. 
II. AssuRING .AFFIRMATIVE AGENCY AcrrnN To AscERTAIN 
THE VIEWS OF POOR PEOPLE 
A. Generally 
Officials responsible for promulgating rules substantially affect-
ing the economically underprivileged segment of our society should, 
where feasible, increase their existing efforts to ascertain indepen-
dently the views of poor people. They should also devise additional 
effective means by which to do so. This approach stresses the ability 
of the several agencies involved to develop and utilize affirmative 
procedures for obtaining, through direct and continuing contact 
with the poor themselves, the specific information that they should 
consider when they formulate their programs affecting the poor. 
There is an analogy in Budget Bureau Circular A-85, which is 
entitled "Consultation with Heads of State and Local Governments 
in Development of Federal Rules, Regulations, Procedures and 
Guidelines." This document orders federal agencies to follow cer-
tain procedures geared to assure that there is adequate consultation 
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with the heads of state and local governments prior to the promul-
gation of rules for the implementation of specific kinds of federal 
programs vitally affecting them. The Defense Production Act of 
1950 also provided that "[a]ny rule, regulation, or order, or amend-
ment thereto, issued under authority of this Act shall be accompa-
nied by a statement that in the formulation thereof there has been 
consultation with industry representatives, including trade associ-
ation representatives, and that consideration has been given to their 
recommendations .... "21 Similarly, federal agencies should follow 
procedures with respect to rulemaking that will assure, where feas-
ible and practicable, independent agency efforts to ascertain directly 
from the poor their views with respect to proposed rules substan-
tially affecting them. 
B. Some Specific Suggestions 
Agencies administering programs of concern to the poor should 
be urged to hold formal hearings-that is, oral public hearings-on 
proposed rules in close geographic proximity to the poor people af-
fected. They should also be urged to obtain witnesses and solicit 
written views from among the affected poor and organizational 
representatives of the affected poor. Federal agencies should use 
special notice and hearing arrangements tailored to meet the pecu-
liar problems of economically underprivileged persons in order to 
assure their effectiveness in accurately and successfully obtaining 
the views of such people. As an illustration, publication of a pro-
posed regulation and notice of a public hearing in the Federal 
Register may constitute adequate notice for middle and upper in-
come Americans whose agents or group representatives read that 
periodical, but it is usually inadequate by itself to apprise the poor. 
To faciliate affirmative agency action to ascertain the views of the 
poor, increased use of field surveys should also be encouraged. In 
addition, or as an alternative to some of the above suggestions, 
agencies should hold very informal conferences with the poor in 
their own neighborhoods in order to discuss with them contemplated 
rulemaking affecting such persons' interests. 
Agencies should also be urged to pay certain of the personal ex-
penses of economically underprivileged witnesses in rulemaking 
hearings where that would help assure adequate representation for 
the poor. In this way the federal agencies may facilitate the appear-
ance of an adequate number and variety of poor people's represen-
21. Act of Sept. 8, 1950, ch. 932, § 709, 64 Stat. 819. 
January 1969] Federal Rulemaking 525 
tatives in such proceedings. If economically underprivileged indi-
viduals must incur transportation, meal, or babysitting costs in 
order to testify on behalf of the poor, of if they must lose a day's 
wages, they should be reimbursed. Unlike the more affluent mem-
bers of our society, poor people cannot afford to finance the extra 
costs involved in representing their own interests. At the present 
time most agencies are probably unable or unwilling to pay such 
expenses incurred by underprivileged persons seeking to represent 
the interests of the poor in rulemaking hearings. In order to remove 
any doubts as to their authority, federal agencies should be ex-
pressly empowered, in their discretion, to pay the basic personal 
expenses incurred by poor persons acting in such a capacity. 
Each agency administering programs ·with a high impact on the 
poor should also be urged to constitute, where practicable, a for-
mal advisory committee to apprise the agency of poor people's 
interests that should be weighed in the operation of its programs. 
These committees should be composed of persons who are them-
selves economically underprivileged, or the direct and close repre-
sentatives of such persons. The committees should be continually 
kept informed of those activities of their respective agencies that 
specially concern them; and they should be consulted for their 
views before the agency makes any rules substantially affecting the 
interests of the economically underprivileged segment of our society. 
All expenses incident to the operation of such advisory bodies 
should be borne by the respective agencies. "Regulations for the 
Formation and Use of Advisory Committees" already exist.22 These 
might be revised, expanded, and reoriented for this purpose. 
In the future, the Administrative Conference of the United 
States should monitor the extent to which federal agencies actually 
do institute specific procedures like those just discussed. Government 
officials must be induced to increase their 01m affirmative efforts to 
ascertain the views of the poor with respect to rulemaking which 
affects them substantially. If the Conference finds that the recom-
mendations urging voluntary agency action in this regard are not 
adequately affecting official behavior patterns in practice, it might 
then recommend that agencies be required to follow certain of the 
above specific procedures with respect to particular programs. 
Although federal agencies might, if necssary, be required to fol-
low some of the procedures outlined above in specific programs or 
situations, there are a number of reasons why federal agencies 
22. Exec. Order No. 11,007, 27 Fed. Reg. 1875 (1962). 
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should not be required to follow certain of those procedures in every 
case where they engage in rulemaking substantially affecting the 
poor. These procedures may be completely superfluous in a number 
of cases because the views of the poor are unmistakably clear and a 
matter of public record. In addition, many of the specific procedures 
outlined as possible means to induce affirmative agency ascertain-
ment of the poor's interests in agency rulemaking may be very im-
practical. The agencies have an undisputed need to conduct their 
affairs inexpensively, simply, conveniently, flexibly, and expedi-
tiously. Requirements of the sort outlined above may be unusually 
difficult to draft and administer because of the peculiar problems in 
defining precisely those whose views the agency must solicit or ap-
point as representatives of the poor, when or where oral hearings 
or conferences must be held or field surveys taken, and the like. 
Whether an oral hearing should be held with respect to a certain 
proposed rule, precisely where and when it should be held, who 
exactly should be invited to testify, and whether a field survey should 
be made are all judgment questions. Someone, probably the rule-
making agency, must exercise some discretionary judgment. And to 
require useless hearings, conferences, or field surveys, endless lines 
of repetitive and inarticulate witnesses, and the like, would be to 
interject the worst kind of mischief into the administrative process, 
hamstringing rather than improving it. 
However, if federal agencies will voluntarily follow the previous 
suggestions in all those situations where they are feasible, practi-
cable, and necessary to assure that officials are fully informed about 
the relevant interests of the poor, the agencies will help solve the 
problem under consideration. The proposals outlined in this sec-
tion have the advantage of assuring self-starting and independent 
affirmative agency action to secure information directly from the 
poor concerning their position with respect to rulemaking sub-
stantially affecting them. An effective pipeline from the poor to 
those who are responsible for rulemaking decisions could result. 
The fact that the government would bear the sole or primary finan-
cial burden for this mode of assuring consideration of the poor's 
interests in rulemaking also enhances its attractiveness and effec-
tiveness. 
C. The Inadequacy of Affirmative Agency Efforts 
Procedures to assure self-initiated affirmative official action to 
ascertain from the poor their views with respect to agency rulemak-
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ing will, if sound in their details, undoubtedly be helpful; but such 
procedures are entirely inadequate solutions for the problem at hand 
in at least one major respect. They do not completely compensate for 
that which the poor currently lack. Economically underprivileged 
people do not have the resources necessary to assure a technically 
sound and consistently available articulate presentation of their 
views concerning rulemaking to the appropriate agencies. Those seg-
ments of our society with adequate economic resources have long em-
ployed legal counsel-with their special technical proficiencies, 
knowledge, and skill as advocates-for these purposes. By the use of 
lawyers' professional abilities, the well-financed have assured that the 
kind of representation actually afforded their interests before govern-
ment policy makers is qualitatively high, and much more effective 
than it could possibly be othenvise. 
The poor are entitled to, and must have in order to make their 
interests known effectively, both the quantity and quality of repre-
sentation in rulemaking before federal agencies that commercial 
corporations and labor unions consistently utilize. That necessitates 
furnishing the poor, in one way or another, with legal counsel for this 
particular purpose. Because the poor lack the personal and organ-
izational resources to hire such skilled, persistent, and knowledgeable 
help, affirmative agency efforts of the kind discussed above, although 
useful, would still result in qualitatively inadequate representation 
in rulemaking for the economically underprivileged segment of 
our society. The reason for this is that existing sources of public 
and private legal aid to the poor, such as legal aid and public de-
fender programs, do not usually provide the economically under-
privileged segments of our society with representation in rulemak-
ing. These programs are primarily, if not exclusively, concerned 
with serving the interests of individual poor clients in adjudicative 
or potentially adjudicative situations. 
III. A CLEARINGHOUSE COORDINATOR? 
The poor might obtain the quantity and quality of represen-
tation they need for their views in federal rulemaking if a well-
financed clearinghouse-coordinator organization was created. Such 
an organization could systematically furnish all poor people's groups 
in this country with information concerning existing or proposed 
federal administrative regulations having a substantial impact on 
the poor. In addition, it could encourage and coordinate participa-
tion in federal rulemaking by organizations representing the eco-
528 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:511 
nomically underprivileged. Where necessary, this entity could also 
finance participation in rulemaking by various poor people's groups. 
That is, the clearinghouse coordinator might make conditional 
limited-purpose grants to poor people's organizations so that they 
could individually hire personal legal counsel to represent their 
views in a particular rulemaking matter. Such a clearinghouse co-
ordinator would not itself attempt to play any direct role as an 
advocate in the rulemaking process. It would not act as a separate 
representative of the poor. An organization of this type could be 
financed by private contributions, government grants; or both, and, 
it could be constituted as an independent private body under the 
control of all of its constituent users in order to assure the maximum 
satisfaction of its clients. 
Utilization of this kind of clearinghouse coordinator has several 
advantages as a solution to the problem of improved representation 
for the poor in federal rulemaking. It would encourage and facili-
tate more frequent and continuous representation of poor people's 
interests in the rulemaking process by organizations and groups 
representing some segment of the economically underprivileged. The 
clearinghouse coordinator might also result in representation for 
more of the many divergent and disparate interests present in that 
group in our society loosely characterized here as "the poor" than 
would otherwise be the case. In addition, the existence of such a 
body might induce a better and more accurate presentation of the 
views of the poor on many matters than might be the case with some 
other solutions. This is true because the source of the views and the 
representation of those views would be relatively close to the poor 
themselves. Since this solution would provide poor people's groups 
with funds to engage their own separate and personal counsel for 
the purposes of representation and advocacy in rulemaking pro-
ceedings, it would assure that the views of those organizations are 
accurately, articulately, knowledgeably, and aggressively presented 
to the agencies in question. 
Still, such a clearinghouse-coordinator organization is probably 
an inadequate and inefficient solution to the problem at hand. It 
assumes that existing organized groups purporting to represent the 
poor can or will do an adequate job of protecting those people's 
interests with respect to federal rulemaking if such bodies are kept 
informed of the facts, their efforts are coordinated, and sufficient 
financing is made available to them. This is a questionable assump-
tion, although admittedly it is hard to prove or disprove entirely on 
the basis of undisputed evidence. Existing poor people's organizations 
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have sometimes been aware of proposed or existing rules of special 
concern to the poor generally, and yet have failed to act.23 In many 
of these instances, their failure cannot be attributed entirely to a 
lack of organizational resources. 
It should be reiterated that most poor people do not belong to 
organizations dedicated to protecting and advancing their interests; 
and the views of "poor people's groups," or of the controlling 
leadership of such groups, may frequently be out of touch with, or 
divergent from, the interests of the mass of the poor. The clearing-
house-coordinator proposal will not, therefore, consistently assure 
adequate representation in rulemaking for the collective interests 
of the poor as a general group. The device may assure representa-
tion in rulemaking only for the views of organized poor people's 
groups, or for the views of the leadership class of those groups. De-
pending on the specific case, that kind of representation may or may 
not be adequate to protect the interests of the mass of the poor peo-
ple in this country. 
The grant-financed efforts of numerous poor people's groups, 
each seeking to represent separately the interests of the economically 
underprivileged in federal rulemaking, may also be unduly dupli-
catory and therefore wasteful and unnecessarily burdensome to the 
administrative process. Furthermore, many administrative difficulties 
will appear in any effort to entrust a mandatory grant-making respon-
sibility to the clearinghouse coordinator. Must every organizational 
applicant seeking funds with which to represent the poor in federal 
rulemaking be financed? If not, which groups in any given situation 
should be financed? These difficulties could be largely avoided if, 
depending on the facts of each case, the clearinghouse coordinator 
had the option of representing the interests of the poor itself or con-
tracting with others to do so. In addition, freedom for each poor 
people's organization to hire its own separate lawyer for these pur-
poses may be much more expensive and less effective than providing 
the poor with one specialist law firm working full time to represent 
their collective interests in federal rulemaking. 
For all of the above reasons the clearinghouse-coordinator ap-
proach to solving this problem is inadequate. It is too likely to result 
in uneven and inconsistent representation for the collective interests 
23. The Department of Agriculture's Commodity Distribution and Food Stamp 
programs for the poor are an example. Although poor people's organizations were 
aware of the existence of those programs and the Department rules under which they 
were operated, they did not seem to take any active interest in those programs until 
the last year or so. 
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of the poor as a class in federal rulemak.ing. Moreover, it seems 
relatively uneconomical and inefficient. As subsequent discussion 
will demonstrate, a more desirable solution to the problem under 
consideration can be formulated. That solution could assure more 
adequate representation for the poor in federal rulemaking than the 
clearinghouse coordinator. At the same time, it could also incor-
porate, by one means or another, most of the special advantages of 
the clearinghouse coordinator. 
IV. THE INDEPENDENT POOR PEOPLE'S COUNSEL 
A. Generally 
The most desirable solution to the problem under consideration 
would seem to be the creation of a people's counsel organization 
which would hire a staff to represent the interests of the poor in all 
federal rulemaking that substantially affects them.24 Such a counsel 
would be an artificial representative for the poor in this process 
without any pretense of being a democratically chosen spokesman of 
24. This seems to be the general philosophy of the Feighan Bill, H.R. 17974, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), the text of which follows: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, That it is fundamental to wise administrative 
rulemaking that, except in limited or unusual circumstances, persons whose in-
terests may be affected be assured of an opportunity to participate in rulemaking 
through submission of data, views, or arguments to the responsible rulemaking 
agency. Rulemaking frequently affects persons without the resources necessary to 
keep themselves informed concerning proposed rules or to petition for rules or 
amendment or repeal of rules. Hence it is necessary that means be provided 
whereby, insofar as feasible, the interests of such persons may be protected in 
rulemaking and whereby the rulemaking process may be benefited by advocacy on 
behalf of such interests. 
SEC. 2. Section 553, in chapter 5, Administrative Procedure, of title 5, United 
States Code, is hereby amended by adding thereto the following subsection: 
"(f) The Attorney General is directed to enter into contracts with, or to make 
grants subject to appropriate conditions to, the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association, or such other nationally organized nonprofit bodies with generally 
similar objectives as he may deem desirable, whereby such body or bodies may be 
provided with funds to enable them to participate in rulemaking in accordance 
with this section on behalf of interested persons who, because of their lack of 
personal resources, are unable effectively to do so. Any such body shall be deemed 
to be an interested person for the purpose of this section. Such body or bodies 
may contract with other persons to aid in effectuating the purposes of such con-
tract or grant. The Attorney General is authorized to adopt such rules or regula-
tions as may be appropriate to the administration of this subsection. He is autho-
rized, further, after consultation with the agency involved, by order to make this 
section applicable to matters relating to public property, loans, grants, benefits, 
or contracts in circumstances where he determines tliat such matters so affect the 
interests of persons of limited means as to make it aJ:>propriate that, in connection 
with rulemalcing with respect to such matters, a body or bodies receiving a con• 
~ct or grant under this subsection should have an opportunity to represent such 
mterests." 
SEC. 3. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such funds as are 
necessary to carry out the provisions of section 2. 
Senator Hart introduced the same bill in the Senate as S. 3703, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968). 
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the poor. This counsel, as an advocate, would be charged with the 
responsibility of separately and independently representing the 
collective interests of the poor as a class in all federal rulemaking. 
Where the interests of the poor on a pending rule are divergent, it 
would also be responsible for assuring the representation of those 
disparate views either in its own presentation or by other individuals 
or organizations. In performing its representational responsibility 
for the economically underprivileged, such an advocate would be 
under an affirmative duty to seek the advice and help of relevant 
sources of every kind, whether private or governmental, individual 
or organizational. It would be obliged to use every device available 
to keep in as close touch as possible with the needs and views of 
those whose interests it purports to represent. Although such a 
counsel's staff would probably be middle class, great pains should 
be taken, and special procedures instituted, to prevent it from being 
captured or dominated by a middle-class point of view. 
As an aid in this respect, it might be desirable to establish official 
advisory committees to the poor people's counsel in each area of 
major concern such as welfare programs, housing, employment, 
education, and so forth. The membership of such committees should 
be composed of individuals who are as representative of the poor of 
this country as possible. These committees should not, however, 
become the exclusive source for the poor's communication with 
their people's counsel. There is always a danger that committee 
members, regardless of the care exercised in their appointment, may 
have divergent views and interests from the mass of the economically 
underprivileged. For this reason, the people's counsel should hold 
informal hearings among the poor on the larger and more important 
issues so that it can better represent their interests on those subjects. 
Close liaison between the people's counsel and Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) community action groups, legal aid societies, 
civil rights organizations, and other poor people's groups through-
out the country is also crucial. This will help to assure that the 
people's counsel will remain as reflective as possible of the real in-
terests, views, and needs of those people in our society that it ulti-
mately must serve. 
B. Specific Functions of the Poor People's Counsel 
The people's counsel would do everything necessary to represent 
effectively the interests of the poor in all federal rulemaking sub-
stantially affecting them. Such a body would perform most of the 
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same functions for the poor with respect to the federal rulemaking 
process that Washington law firms perform for their well-financed 
clients. It would monitor the activities of federal agencies to assure 
that it is fully informed with respect to all rulemaking or potential 
rulemaking affecting the interests of the poor. When a federal 
agency proposes new rules of concern to the economically under-
privileged, counsel for the poor would present their views on the 
desirability of the proposed· regulations and actively lobby for the 
interests of the poor. This would include the drafting of substitute 
rules for the ones suggested by the government agency. Additionally, 
the people's advocate would formulate, and urge the appropriate 
authorities to adopt, entirely new rules and revisions of old rules 
substantially affecting poor persons. To perform these functions, 
the people's counsel would need an adequate staff not only of 
lawyers, but also of economists and other social scientists. This 
would assure that it will be capable of competently responding in 
kind to the arguments and technical data presented by the personnel 
of the various agencies with which it must deal. 
In addition, the poor people's advocate would be charged with 
some of the specific obligations of the clearinghouse coordinator. 
That is, it would keep organizations representing the poor informed 
as to all federal rulemaking affecting their interests, and it would 
coordinate and facilitate those organizations' separate participation 
in such rulemaking if any of them had the desire and capacity to do 
so. 
The people's counsel should also be authorized, in its discretion, 
to make contracts with other organizations as a means of helping to 
represent, in the rulemaking process, minority or divergent view-
points with respect to the interests of the poor. Interjection of such 
minority or divergent views into the rulemaking process may be a 
function that the people's counsel will want to contract out to others 
because, by doing so, it might avoid some possible internal conflicts 
of interest in its organizational setup. The extent to which this 
contracting power is actually used ought to be left to the sole dis-
cretion of the people's counsel. Nevertheless, the expectation is that 
the staff of the people's counsel will normally perform all of the 
representation functions assigned to it. 
The people's counsel would occasionally propose to the President 
or Congress, or both, new legislation (or executive orders) geared to 
institute reforms in administrative programs substantially affecting 
the poor. An agency may refuse to exercise its existing authority to 
make the kind of rules deemed necessary by the people's advocate 
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to protect the interests of its constituency. Or an agency willing to 
make such rules may not have the authority to do so because legisla-
tion forbids it or fails to authorize it. In all of the above cases 
Congress can correct the situation by statute and thereby ensure the 
promulgation of rules satisfactory to the people's counsel. As a 
result, the advocate of the poor should be empowered to propose 
legislation to Congress or the President when that would be an aid 
in performing its primary responsibility-effectively representing 
the poor's collective interests in federal rulemaking. 
The people's counsel should also be empowered to play an inde-
pendent role in the judicial review of federal administrative rules. 
As a representative of the poor, the counsel should be able to chal-
lenge in court, under its own name, the validity of any federal rule 
substantially affecting poor persons. Only with this authority will 
the views of the people's counsel have any creditable weight with 
the agencies before which it is to operate. The image and attendant 
effectiveness of the people's advocate will be greatly enhanced if 
federal agencies know that the people's counsel can freely institute 
judicial review of agency rules under its own name and solely on its 
own initiative. Absent that authority, the people's counsel might be 
totally ignored by the administrative establishment; officialdom 
would know that there is little bite behind the counsel's bark. Power 
to seek judicial review of an agency's rules on the grounds that they 
are unauthorized, are in conflict with a statute, are unconstitutional, 
or have been promulgated without the required procedure is, there-
fore, very important. The poor's advocate should not be forced to 
give up after it unsuccessfully opposes the promulgation of a certain 
rule that is antithetical to the interests of the economically under-
privileged if that rule is vulnerable to attack in the courts. 
The ability to sue in its own name as an official representative of 
the poor is also especially important to the people's counsel because 
that right frees the counsel from any dependency on particular poor 
persons who would otherwise have to be the named plaintiffs in such 
suits. Since it is responsible for representing the collective interests 
of the poor, the people's counsel should not be put in the position of 
having to reconcile that duty ·with the individual interests of a 
particular poor person acting as official plaintiff in a court case. In 
addition, if the poor people's advocate can sue in its o·wn name, 
many administrative difficulties and extra expenses can be avoided. 
Congress should, therefore, specifically vest the people's counsel 
with this right. Delegation of that authority to such a counsel would 
not, of course, preclude other individuals and organizations with 
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standing from seeking judicial review of federal agency rules on 
behalf of poor people's interests. 
A very broad precedent supporting the right of a representative 
body to seek judicial review of administrative action adversely 
affecting those whose interests it seeks to protect is Office of Com-
munication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC.25 That case 
held that a church has standing as a "party in interest" to seek 
judicial review as a representative of its members as listeners whose 
interests the FCC is required to protect. Since that organization 
was a voluntary-membership body seeking to assert the rights of 
persons who freely chose to join it, the Church of Christ case might 
be distinguished from the situation under consideration here. How-
ever, if an act of Congress expressly authorized the people's counsel 
to seek judicial review of federal rules having a substantial impact 
on the poor, in its own name as an official representative of such 
persons, the standing of that counsel would be clear. Of course, a 
question might be raised whether a case or controversy exists in a 
judicial proceeding pitting an artificial poor people's representative 
accorded such a statutory right to judicial review against an agency 
whose rules are challenged on behalf of the poor. However, it seems 
clear that one exists. A statute of Congress would impose a legal duty 
on the people's counsel to protect the interests of underprivileged 
persons in federal rulemaking-a duty that would include attempts 
to invalidate improper rules in court; and the various federal agen-
cies have an adverse legal obligation to defend the integrity of their 
rules against attack by others. Some might argue that :Muskrat v. 
United States26 casts doubt upon the ability of such a people's counsel 
to sue in its own name as a representative of the poor, even after 
Congress specifically empowers it to do so. But that case is probably 
no longer the law.27 
As a wise allocation of its resources, the people's counsel may 
frequently elect to assist other agencies representing the poor to 
prosecute court cases relating to the validity of federal administra-
tive regulations instead of instituting such suits itself. To this end it 
might distribute to appropriate legal aid organizations memoranda 
explaining that specified regulations may be subject to successful 
attack in the courts. In addition, the people's advocate could give 
25. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
26. 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (holding that Congress could not authorize named Cherokee 
Indians to institute suits on their own behalf and on behalf of other Cherokees having 
similar allotments to determine the validity of acts of Congress restricting alienation 
of certain land and increasing the number of persons entitled to share in it). 
27. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Tmcr 374 (1959). 
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technical or financial aid to a local legal aid organization attempting 
to prosecute, on its own, a test case concerning some federal rule 
that is inconsistent with the poor's interests. The people's counsel 
could also generally coordinate the efforts of legal aid groups with 
respect to the judicial review of federal agency rules. 
The people's counsel should also be empowered to intervene 
under its mm name on behalf of the poor in those agency adjudica-
tive proceedings substantially affecting the economically under-
privileged. The poor as a group may have as vital an interest in 
the outcome of certain agency adjudication as they do in most 
rulemaking proceedings affecting them. Many very important ad-
ministrative policies are established as a result of ad hoc agency 
adjudication. At present, the collective interests of economically 
underprivileged people are inadequately represented in such federal 
administrative adjudication; effective participation in those pro-
ceedings requires certain skills and expertise not available to most 
local legal aid societies who have had little experience with the 
intricacies of adjudication before federal agencies. Therefore, ap-
portioning this function to the poor people's counsel seems wise. 
Representation of the poor in agency adjudicative proceedings 
is closely and intimately tied to the counsel's other responsibilities. 
Assigning this function to the people's advocate will economically 
utilize the expertise in federal administrative law that it will neces-
sarily acquire through the performance of its other duties. However, 
the people's counsel will not be empowered to initiate adjudicative 
proceedings before federal agencies in its own name; as an official 
representative of the poor, it will be limited to participating in such 
proceedings as an intervenor. Where necessary, traditional channels 
of legal aid can be expected to initiate such agency adjudicative 
proceedings in the name of individual economically underprivileged 
clients. 
Ordinarily the people's counsel should not perform the responsi-
bilities of an ombudsman or personal legal counsel. That is, it 
should not normally handle the individual grievances of, or seek 
remedies for, particular poor clients. An ombudsman or personal 
legal counsel becomes preoccupied with the details of numerous 
individual claims and is therefore likely to lack a sufficiently broad 
independent perspective about the best ways of serving the poor as a 
whole. If it acted to represent particular clients, the proposed body's 
individual caseload would be much larger than its job of affirmatively 
representing the poor as a class in federal rulemaking. As a result, 
the latter function may be obliterated by the former function. In 
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addition, since all citizens, rich or poor, may experience administra-
tive arbitrariness and ineptitude, all should have access to an om-
budsman. But to be effective, the office contemplated here must 
concentrate on and become expert in the special problems of the 
poor. It must look at these problems and proposed solutions solely 
from the viewpoint of the poor. Furthermore, the people's counsel 
should be primarily concerned with affirmatively representing the 
interests of such individuals prior to, and as a means of avoiding, 
their need for an ombudsman; but because of the nature of an om-
budsman's responsibility, a people's counsel charged with that addi-
tional function may see the needs for affirmative representation in 
rulemaking primarily in terms of the poor's appearance in its office 
for ombudsman's help. However, there may be very rare occasions 
when the people's counsel should be able to represent a particular 
person because that is the best or only means by which to test a 
certain agency policy affecting the poor as a class. In those cases it 
should be free to do so, but only if absolutely essential to its pri-
mary function as advocate for the collective interests of the poor in 
federal rulemaking. 
Finally, it should be recognized that the interests of the poor and 
the interests of higher income groups may sometimes be identical 
with regard to certain rulemaking or agency adjudication. To assure 
adequate representation for the economically underprivileged, the 
people's counsel must have the independent authority to participate 
on behalf of the poor in all rulemaking and agency adjudication of 
concern to those people. However, a wise allocation of the advocate's 
resources should lead it to concentrate its efforts on representation 
of the poor in those situations where the interests of the poor are not 
adequately protected by the endeavors of other more affluent groups. 
C. Locating and Structuring the People's Counsel 
I. A Government Office of People's Counsel 
The proposed people's counsel might be constituted as a perma-
nent, single-purpose, and relatively independent federal government 
office located outside of any agency before which it would have to 
represent the poor. A number of arguments of varying merit have 
been made in favor of making the poor's advocate an integral part 
of the governmental establishment. It has been contended that 
federal agencies might be more receptive to a presentation of the 
poor's views by another part of the official establishment than by 
outsiders. Therefore, the argument continues, as a part of the 
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governmental structure the people's counsel might be more effective 
than if it were outside of that structure. If it were part of the official 
establishment, such a people's counsel might also be accorded access 
to useful information and resources that it otherwise might not be 
able to obtain. Furthermore, indicating that representation of the 
poor's interests has special importance by making it a part of the 
government itself might give the economically underprivileged the 
feeling that the official establishment really cares about their inter-
ests. As a government office, the people's counsel might also have a 
certain prestige and respectability not otherwise obtainable which 
would facilitate the recruitment and retention of a competent staff. 
In practice, many of these assertions about the advantages of 
placing the people's counsel inside of government may prove to be 
unrealistic or erroneous. Moreover, location of the people's counsel 
as a part of government may actually be disadvantageous for a num-
ber of reasons. As a full-time employee of the United States Govern-
ment, the poor's advocate is more likely than otherwise to become, 
at least over time, a captive of the establishment-out of touch with 
the poor, docile, and therefore ineffective. After all, a certain in 
terrorem effect would always exist because the appropriations for 
the office would continually be subjected to congressional approval. 
And the professional associations of the staff of the people's counsel 
under these circumstances would be with other government officials, 
all working for the same principal, and all having common interests 
and problems in the long run. 
The idea that a government agency can do an effective job 
because it would be a member of the team is chimerical. One of 
the basic strengths of our legal system is its reliance on the adversary 
system. The handling of things by a member of the team smacks 
of "Big Brotherism." The poor would probably lack confidence 
in a people's counsel who, although charged with representing their 
interests, was part of the very government establishment they wanted 
to influence. The poor might well believe, regardless of actual 
performance, that any full-time government employee purportedly 
representing their interests was really not doing so. Furthermore, 
the underprivileged segments of our society seem to reject the basic 
philosophy underlying the approach that would appoint a govern-
ment official to represent their interests. In the past few years the 
more militant elements of the poor have demanded that the poor 
themselves be accorded a direct voice in controlling their destiny. 
Finally, locating the people's counsel as a part of the federal estab-
lishment may make it less effective than otherwise possible because 
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its freedom to innovate and experiment may be curtailed by govern-
ment red tape and bureaucratic requirements. 
There is some precedent supporting the suggestion that a special 
government house counsel be created to represent a group unable 
to represent effectively its mvn interests before federal agencies be-
cause of its large size, amorphous nature, and lack of organization. 
There was an independent Office of Consumers' Counsel charged 
with asserting consumers' interests in bituminous coal proceedings 
before the National Bituminous Coal Commission.28 The Depart-
ment of Agriculture also had, at one time, a Division of Consumers' 
Counsel which participated in proceedings within that department on 
behalf of consumers.29 A similar position seems to have existed for a 
period in the National Recovery Administration, the Department of 
Labor, and the Department of the Interior.30 More recently, Presi-
dent Johnson announced the creation of the Office of Consumer 
Counsel in the United States Department of Justice.31 This new office 
did not begin to function until the very end of 1968 because the first 
appointee died before he could assume his duties. The status of the 
office is now unclear due to the change in national administrations. 
In any case, the newly created Office of Consumer Counsel would 
not be an adequate solution for the problem at hand since the inter-
ests of the poor affected by the rulemaking process are substantially 
broader than those interests deriving from their status as consumers. 
History may support the idea that a people's counsel of the sort 
contemplated here should not be constituted as a part of the gov-
ernment establishment. Almost all of the consumer's counsel offices 
organized as separate entities ·within the federal establishment have 
atrophied and disappeared. Most of them seem to have faded be-
cause, among other things, they were ineffective and made no 
significant contribution to the administrative process. Although not 
completely clear, the reasons for the conspicuous lack of success of 
these offices seem to have included their intimate connection with 
the government establishment (as an official and integral part of it), 
and their structural position within that establishment-that is, the 
fact that they were located inside of the very agencies before which 
they were to represent the consumer's interests.32 
28. 1968-69 U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 687, 708. 
29. Id. at 691. 
30. Id. at 687. 
31. See White House Press Conference of Betty Furness, Special Assistant to the 
President on Consumer Affairs, and Attorney General Ramsey Clark discussing the 
establishment of this office (mimeo Feb. 6, 1968). 
32. On the operation of these consumer counsels see generally R. BAKER, THE 
January 1969] Federal Rulemaking 539 
2. A Private Office of the People's Counsel 
A second means of constituting the people's counsel is to utilize 
a private organization outside of government for these purposes. 
By relying on a body outside the federal establishment, the people's 
representative in rulemak.ing proceedings may be able to be more 
closely tied to and identified with the needs of the poor than would 
be possible if it were an official organ of the United States Govern-
ment. A nongovernmental body may also be able to communicate 
more effectively with the poor than an official one. As a private 
organization separated from the government hierarchy, it may be less 
susceptible to being captured by the ideas and values of the govern-
ment agencies before which it would represent the interests of the 
poor. A private people's counsel may also be less susceptible than a 
similar public counsel to intimidation by government agencies; if 
so, the private organization would be a more aggressive and persis-
tent representative of the poor's interests in rulemaking than a 
public body. 
As suggested above, such a private body may also be more flexible 
and thus better able to experiment and innovate in the performance 
of its assignment than a government-based equivalent. This greater 
freedom may be especially useful with respect to recruiting a staff 
and administering its activities. Moreover, this freedom may mean 
that a private people's counsel would be more efficient in the long 
run than a government body. As noted earlier, the poor are likely to 
have greater confidence in a private counsel's representation of their 
interests than in a public counsel's performance of that job because 
their advocate would not be part of the very establishment which 
they are trying to influence. The actions of a private counsel may 
also be more visible to the poor than the actions of a public counsel 
which could easily get lost in the huge federal bureaucracy and be-
come relatively invisible to outside viewers. This greater visibility 
might make a private counsel more responsive to the interests of the 
poor and a greater source of satisfaction to them. 
On the other hand, it has been urged that such a private orga-
nizational representative of the poor might not be as influential or 
effective in rulemak.ing proceedings as an official agency of the 
NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL COMMISSION: .ADMINISTRATION OF THE BITUMINOUS COAL 
Acr, 1937-1941 at 221-53 (1941); H. JOHNSON, THE BLUE EAGLE FROM EGG TO EARTH 295-96 
(1935); L. LYON, P. HOMAN, G. TERBORGH, L. LORWIN, C. DEARING, & L. MARSHALL, THE 
NATIONAL RECOVERY .ADMINISTRATION 123-28, 210-14 (1935); Lewis, The "Consumer" and 
"Public'' Interests Under Public Regulation, 46 J. POL. EcoN. 97, 103-06, 106 n.10 
(1938); E. NOURSE, J. DAVIS, & J. BLACK, THREE YEARS OF THE AGRICULTURAL .ADJUSTMENT 
.ADMINISTRATION 391-95 (1937). 
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United States charged with the same obligation. By virtue of its 
official status, a public people's counsel charged with representing 
the poor may be offered greater cooperation and opportunity for 
participation in rulemaking affecting the poor than a private organ-
ization charged with the same duty. In addition, a private people's 
counsel may not be, in and of itself, as effective a mechanism as a 
public people's counsel to convince the poor that the federal govern-
ment really wants their interests represented in its rulemaking 
process. A more likely disadvantage of a private body might be its 
greater susceptibility to capture by the interests of some small seg-
ment of the poor, with the result that it would only serve the in-
terests of that special group among the poor rather than the interests 
of the poor as a whole. However, this disadvantage can be offset by 
structural devices geared to avoid that situation; and it must be 
weighed against the specific advantage that the private organization 
is less susceptible to being captured by the "government view" and 
more likely to be in close touch with the real needs of the poor. 
3. The Public Broadcasting Corporation Model: A 
Compromise Solution 
A third solution to the problem of properly positioning the 
people's counsel is a beneficial compromise between the alternative 
of locating the advocate for the underprivileged inside the federal 
government and locating it entirely outside and separate from that 
establishment. The poor's representative described herein could be 
constituted as a completely independent, federally chartered cor-
poration similar in most respects to the recently created Corporation 
for Public Broadcasting33 or the long established American National 
Red Cross.34 These organizations are hybrid public-private bodies. 
As such, they provide a model for the people's counsel which may 
combine the advantages of the purely public body with the ad-
vantages of the purely private body and minimize the disadvantages 
of each. 
The Corporation for Public Broadcasting, for example, was 
created by a special act of Congress as an independent, nonprofit, 
and no-stock entity.35 It is headed by a bipartisan body of fifteen 
members whose qualifications and fixed terms of office are set by 
statute. They are appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate and are authorized to make policy for the body 
33. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
34. 36 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). 
35. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (Supp. III, 1965·1967). 
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and direct its affairs. The act creating the corporation specifies its 
purposes and powers. It also expressly authorizes the body to obtain 
grants from, and make contracts with, individuals and private and 
governmental organizations and institutions. According to the stat-
ute, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting must submit detailed 
annual reports to the President and Congress outlining the activities, 
financial condition, accomplishments of the organization, and any 
recommendations it deems appropriate. In addition, the statute re-
quires an annual audit of the corporation's books by an independent 
certified public accountant. The financial operations of the body 
and its grantees' use of corporation funds may also be audited by 
the United States Government for those fiscal years during which 
federal funds are involved. 
But the public broadcasting body is otherwise independent of 
federal authority and is more nearly private than public. The statute 
specifically declares that it is not "an agency or establishment of the 
United States Government."36 Neither the directors of the corpora-
tion nor its agents are federal employees by virtue of their connec-
tion with the organization. In addition, full-time federal government 
employees are specifically excluded from appointment to the govern-
ing board of the corporation. Finally, the enabling act expressly 
notes that nothing contained in any of its provisions "shall be 
deemed . . . to authorize any department, agency, officer, or em-
ployee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or 
control . . . over the Corporation or any of its grantees or con-
tractors . . . .''37 
The private corporate structure of a people's counsel modeled 
after the Corporation for Public Broadcasting assures it the advan-
tages of a purely nongovernmental body. An organization of this 
kind is effectively insulated from federal control of its day-to-day 
policy determinations. It can aggressively represent the interests of 
the poor before federal agencies and advocate views distasteful to 
officialdom without fear of crippling government intervention. Such 
a body is also free, because of its private organizational structure, 
of all of the operational rigidities and inflexibility associated with 
a government agency. Like a purely private entity, such a corpora-
tion is not bound by the rules of the federal bureaucracy with 
respect to such things as the hiring and compensation of staff, and 
the means by which its business is conducted. Consequently, this 
corporate entity will have as much freedom to experiment and 
!16. 47 U.S.C. § !!96(b) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
!!7. 47 U.S.C. § !!98 (Supp. III, 1965-1967). 
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adapt its practices to changing exigencies as a purely private organi-
zation. The structure of a corporation of this kind also permits it to 
draw very easily on both public and private means of support with-
out unduly complicating the organization's affairs or threatening 
its independence in the way that a government agency's indepen-
dence would be threatened. 
In addition, a people's counsel corporation of the type under 
discussion here, like a purely private entity of that sort, can be 
more closely tied to, and identified with, the needs of the poor than 
a similar government body. This can be achieved by stipulating 
certain specific qualifications for appointment to the organization's 
private governing board. Similarly, an entity modeled after the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting may also be able to communi-
cate with the poor more easily and flexibly than if it were a 
direct part of the federal establishment. Because this kind of entity 
is not part of the "official government team," it may be less suscep-
tible than a purely public body to being intimidated or captured 
by the ideas, values, and interests of the agencies with which it deals. 
The economically underprivileged may also have more confidence 
in a people's counsel structured in this way than in one located 
within the federal government; it is apparently independent of 
federal influence and is controlled by a private board structured 
to reflect the interests of the poor. The actions of such a govern-
ment-chartered but independent counsel may also be more visible to 
the poor than a similar government counsel lost inside the vast 
federal establishment. 
If the people's counsel were constituted as a body like the Corpo-
ration for Public Broadcasting, it would also have many of the im-
portant advantages of a government-based people's counsel. In 
quasi-public form, it may have higher status and prestige than 
a purely private people's counsel. Thus, it might well be able to 
secure a more qualified staff and a stronger board of directors than 
could a private body. Such an organization can easily be funded by 
the national government and can deal to some extent as an official 
equal with federal agencies. As a quasi-official body, federal agencies 
might be more receptive to its presentation of the poor's views 
than if those views were presented by a purely private body; and, 
a quasi-official people's counsel might be accorded access to informa-
tion and resources not as easily obtainable by a purely private entity. 
This seems to have been true of the Red Cross, for example. Con-
stituting the people's counsel as such a quasi-official body might also 
give the poor a feeling that the federal government itself really cares 
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about them and is attempting to ensure fair representation for their 
views ,vi.th respect to rulemaking that vitally affects their interests. 
At the same time, the independent structure of the people's counsel 
organization assures the poor that a meaningless "Uncle Tom" has 
not been created. 
The above discussion suggests that the best way of structuring 
the people's counsel is to establish it as a quasi-public body modeled 
on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. At the start, such a 
body would, of course, require action by Congress. After it was set 
up, it would not be dependent on the government to any appreci-
able extent except perhaps for part of its financing-an aspect 
which will be discussed below. Careful drafting of the enabling 
statute should assure the creation of an effective and meaningful 
advocate for the poor in all federal rulemaking substantially 
affecting them. 
D. Financing the People's Counsel 
Financing the people's counsel raises additional problems. It is 
clear that a rather large infusion of new money will be needed to 
support such an entity on a long-term, continuing, and effective 
basis. Resources currently available to the poor and their organiza-
tional representatives are totally inadequate to support this new 
responsibility in any satisfactory way. The source of the extra money 
required could be federal, private, or both. Utilization of federal 
money for this purpose has some distinct advantages. The function 
which must be performed is too important and urgent a part of the 
federal administrative process to entrust its support to the uncertain-
ties of private fund raising. Only an infusion of federal money can 
guarantee, relatively soon, the kind of funding that is necessary for 
this project to assure proper, immediate representation of the type 
contemplated here. The circumstances of the era in which we live 
suggest that it is too late to talk solely in terms of a short-term 
demonstration project. What is needed-and needed now-is ade-
quate representation for the poor in federal rulemaking on a perma-
nent, reliable, and quantitatively sufficient basis. 
However, it may be possible to secure the funds needed to 
promote a quasi-public people's counsel from nongovernmental 
sources. Large charitable foundations might provide a long-term 
guarantee of adequate revenue, especially if they understood the 
vital and special importance of this particular project. In addition, 
individual and business contributors might be induced to support 
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such a body in the same way that they support charities such as legal 
aid societies. However, to attract substantial gifts of private funds 
from individual or business donors, the people's counsel corporation 
must be a tax exempt charity. In order to clear up any doubts on 
that subject, Congress should specifically stipulate in the statute 
creating the people's counsel that it is tax exempt for these and 
other purposes. 
A number of arguments suggest the long-term desirability of 
financing such a people's advocate exclusively from nongovernment 
funds if that should prove practical, feasible, and realizable suffi-
ciently quickly. As a contractor with the federal government-
bound to provide in return for monies furnished the representation 
required-the people's counsel becomes, to some extent at least, 
a tainted instrument of the government in the eyes of the poor. 
Even if it is not true, the poor may feel that their counsel will not 
bite the hand that feeds it. Furthermore, because of the grant-
making agency's authority to discontinue grants to the people's 
counsel, that agency will be in a position to exert pressure on the 
advocate for the poor which might be deleterious to the most 
vigorous performance of its duties. If the people's counsel even 
fears that aggresive and persistent representation in rulemaking 
of certain unpopular views favoring the poor might induce a with-
drawal of federal funds, it may become timid, lethargic, and unneces-
sarily cautious. In addition, a grant of federal funds is rarely made 
without relatively detailed conditions, and such strings might 
remove some of the desirable flexibility and capacity to innovate 
and experiment normally possessed by a privately financed operation 
of the same sort. 
However, the above objections to the use of federal funds are 
not sufficiently important to be controlling if government money is in 
fact necessary to finance such a people's counsel quickly, adequately, 
and on a long-term basis. If government financing is required, the 
OEO might logically be considered as a funding agency. The sole 
purpose of the OEO is to help the impoverished of this country. In 
addition, it is in an especially good position and has the specialized 
resources to evaluate the faithfulness and effectiveness with which 
the people's counsel represents the interests of the poor. Through its 
Community Action Programs, Vista Volunteers, Legal Services Of-
fices, and Job Corps Centers, the OEO is in daily, intimate contact 
with the poor. It also has the advantage of a broad and continuing 
experience with the poor and their special needs and problems, and 
a particular interest in providing funds to secure adequate legal 
representation for the economically underprivileged. Empowering 
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the OEO Legal Services Program to make grants to a people's counsel 
for the purposes outlined in this Article might just round out this 
federal agency's current attack on inadequate legal representation 
for the poor generally. 
On the other hand, there is a very persuasive reason to appoint 
another federal agency as the grant-making body. The OEO is 
one of the most significant federal agencies making rules with a 
substantial impact on the poor. That body will, therefore, be one of 
the agencies before which the people's counsel will continuously 
have to represent the collective interests of the poor. If the OEO 
were designated as the agency to finance the people's counsel, it 
would necessarily be put in a position whereby it could influence-
perhaps detrimentally-its grantee's representation of the poor with 
respect to the OEO's rulemaking. Regardless of the purity of the 
OEO's actions in this regard, such a structural situation might cause 
the people's counsel to be unnecessarily timid in representing the 
poor's interests before the OEO. Designation of the OEO as grant 
maker for this purpose would also make less credible to the poor the 
efforts of the people's counsel to represent their interests before the 
OEO. Even if it were untrue, the poor might think that their counsel 
would be likely to play ball with its benefactor. For these reasons, 
any government grantor of funds to support the people's counsel 
should not be an operating agency whose programs have a large im-
pact on the poor. 
V. SECTION 4 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr 
A. Generally 
Even if the above recommendations are adopted, there is in-
adequate assurance that the interests of the poor will be repre-
sented in federal rulemaking unless some means is devised by which 
to guarantee such persons notice of proposed regulations substan-
tially affecting them and an opportunity to submit their views to the 
proper authorities. The required notice and opportunity-to-partici-
pate provisions of section 4, subsections (b)-(e) of the APA might be 
adequate for this purpose were it not for the blanket exemptions 
from those provisions found in section 4(a).38 
38. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1964): 
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent 
that there is involved-
(!) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or 
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, 
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts. 
(b) General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal 
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served 
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A majority of the federal administrative programs substantially 
affecting the poor are excepted from the notice and opportunity 
to participate requirements of subsections (b)-(e) by the exemption 
for matters relating "to public property, loans, grants, benefits or 
contracts" found in subsection (a)(2). This means that in rule-
making for most programs of special concern to the poor, federal 
agencies need not give any notice of proposed regulations in the 
Federal Register. Similarly, in the excepted situations, federal 
agencies need not allow "interested persons," including the poor 
or their representatives, to participate in rulemaking "through the 
submission of written data, views, or arguments" or through "the 
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule." 
0£ course, the relevant agencies have the discretionary authority 
to give notice and allow participation in the excepted situations, but 
they are under no obligation to do so. 
B. Should the APA Be Modified To Cure this Problem? 
Question 3 of the special questionnaire sent to the relevant 
federal agencies as part of this study asked: 
In developing and promulgating rules for the implementation of 
each of these programs [with a substantial impact on the poor], does 
your department or agency follow the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-
or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice 
shall include-(!) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rulemaking proceed-
ings; 
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and 
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved. 
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not 
apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice; or 
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and 
a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice 
and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or con-
trary to the public interest. 
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons 
an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written 
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. 
After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incor-
porate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and 
purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after 
opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply 
instead of this subsection. 
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not 
less than 30 days before its effective date except-
(1) a su!Js~antive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a 
restriction; 
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or 
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published 
with the rule. 
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issu-
ance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. 
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553(e) [APA section 4, subsections (b)-(e)], even when the rulemaking 
proceeding is excepted from these provisions by one of the exclu-
sions in 5 U.S.C. 553(a) [APA section 4(a)]? If you do not do so, 
please describe the procedures you do employ in rulemaking in each 
of these programs. 
The ovenvhelming majority of answers to this question indicated 
that the reporting agencies do not follow the notice and opportunity-
to-participate procedures of subsections (b)-(e) when their rulemak-
ing is excepted from them under section 4(a).39 Only a very few 
agencies indicated a contrary practice, and even these confessed to 
inconsistency in this regard.40 In addition, rulemaking procedures 
actually utilized by the agencies in the excepted situations are in-
adequate substitutes for those found in subsections (b)-(e) of APA 
section 4. Substitute procedures are not consistent and do not, in 
most cases, assure adequate notice to the poor or a sufficient oppor-
tunity for their participation. In some cases not governed by subsec-
tions (b)-(e), the agencies simply determine the rule they think ap-
propriate and promulgate it without notifying or consulting with 
anyone outside the agency.41 In other cases, agencies give notice to, 
and engage in informal consultation with, whomever they happen to 
think appropriate under the circumstances.42 
39. The Department of Agriculture, for example, reported that "the Department 
does not follow the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-553(e) in developing and promulgat-
ing rules for the programs listed above"; the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment reported that "the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-(e) are not followed for 
programs covered by the exemption"; and the Veteran's Administration reported that 
"in developing and promulgating rules for the implementation of veteran's programs 
we do not generally follow the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-553(e), as our rulemaking 
procedures arc excepted by the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2)." 
40. For example, the Department of Labor reported that "in cases of rulemaking 
excepted from 5 U .S.C. 553 the Department of Labor does nevertheless follow the 
provisions of section 553 when it deems it appropriate or desirable to do so." The De-
partment of Transportation also reported that while it does follow § 553(b)·(e) [APA 
§ 4, subsections (b)•(e)] for some programs exempted from § 553 (AP A § 4), at the 
present time it does not do so for most such e.....:empted programs. 
41. For example, the Small Business Administration reported that "under the 
exemption in 5 U.S.C. § 553(a), rules for [the Local Development Company Loan 
Program and the Economic Opportunity Loan Program] are initially published and 
issued in the form adopted by the agency." The Department of Labor reported as to 
rulemaking exempted from § 553 (APA § 4) that it "frequently gives public notice of 
proposed rulcmaking and invites public participation therein when the proposed rule 
is expected to have widespread effects and when for any other reason it is considered 
desirable to obtain the views and objections of those to whom the rules would apply. 
Othenl'ise, the rules are evaluated by the bureau concerned, and are adopted and 
published in the Federal Register." 
42. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority reported that "the formulation 
and implementation of TVA policies in carrying out its program of resource develop• 
ment use are excluded from the rulemaking procedure of 5 U.S.C. § 553 by the provi-
sions of subsection (a). Such policies and the implementations thereof are determined 
by the TV A Board and are recorded for internal guidance in an administrative code. 
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Question 4 of the questionnaire asked the same federal agencies 
responding to the prior question the following: 
What disadvantages, if any, do you see in a statute which would 
eliminate the exclusions now in 5 U.S.C. 553(a) [APA section 4(a)] 
as they may apply to ..• [your programs with a substantial impact 
on the poor], and thereby would make the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 
553(b).553(e) [APA section 4, subsections (b)-(e)] applicable to all 
rulemaking relating to these programs? (Assume that the several 
exceptions now in sections 553(b) through (e) would remain un-
changed.) 
Although a number of agencies saw no substantial disadvantages in 
eliminating the blanket exclusions of subsection (a) under the spe-
cific conditions indicated in the above question,43 most respondents 
thought it undesirable to eliminate any of these exclusions. The rea-
sons advanced for maintaining the section 4(a) exceptions to the re-
quirements of subsections (b)-(e) varied: elimination of the excep-
tions is unnecessary;44 it would make rulemaking too cumbersome 
and thereby deprive the agency of desirable and necessary flexibility 
in the adoption of its rules;45 it would cause needless and injurious 
delay in the final promulgation of rules for some programs;46 it 
They are brought to the attention of interested units of government, organizations, 
and institutions, through discussion and negotiation and appropriate press releases." 
The Department of Agriculture responded with respect to its food programs that it 
does not follow § 553(b)-(e), but that "before their adoption, proposed regulations 
and amendments thereto are discussed with district personnel of the Department and 
with representatives of the State agencies, in general conferences, regional conferences 
or operating as task force groups." (Note that recipients of these food programs or 
their representatives were not among those listed as being consulted.) 
43. The Department of Labor reported that it "does not anticipate substantial 
disadvantages to the programs listed in response to question 1 from the elimination 
of the exclusions now in 5 U.S.C. 553(a)" and the Department of Transportation 
reported that "we would not object to elimination of the exemptions for loans and 
grants. The Department is, in fact, not taking advantage of the exclusion in the case 
of Federal airport aid, and is considering following this course in the case of its other 
grant and loan programs." 
44. For example, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare replied that 
"we have found that in the grant-in-aid field, publication of notice of proposed rule-
making in the Federal Register is not the most suitable way to focus the attention 0£ 
interested persons, agencies and groups on the proposal.'' 
45. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority responded that "application of 
the rulemaking procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553 to the TV A resource development pro-
gram would decrease its flexibility and hinder its effectiveness.'' Similarly the Depart-
ment of Agriculture reported that "it would be unnecessarily cumbersome to apply 
the procedures of the statute and might deprive the Department of a desirable flexi-
bility in the adoption of rules.'' 
46. The Department of the Interior stated, for example, that "we would not favor 
the elimination of the exclusions in 5 U.S.C. 553(a) since to do so could produce 
injurious delays in• the adoption of regulations.'' Similarly, the Small Business Ad-
ministration replied that "it could complicate or delay rulemaking," and the Depart• 
ment of Agriculture reported that the "F.H.A.'s operations would be seriously delayed 
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would cause a tremendous increase in agency work and operating 
costs;47 it would be insufficient as a means to assure in all cases ade-
quate participation by the relevant people in rulemaking and, there-
fore, might sometimes needlessly require an agency to follow two 
sets of procedures in order to involve properly the right persons;48 it 
might put the agency and those most directly affected by its policies 
in an adversary position, thereby discouraging mutual cooperation 
toward obtaining the best solutions to common problems;49 and, it 
might conflict with some specific provision of the agency's enabling 
act.60 
In light of the injurious effect which these exemptions have on 
the ability of the poor to represent their interests in rulemaking, 
the above reasons for continuing them for programs substantially 
affecting the poor do not seem persuasive. It should be noted that 
elimination of the across-the-board exemptions in section 4(a) would 
still leave section 4(b)(B) in force. This provision states that "when 
the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and 
a brief statement of reasons therefore, in the rules issued) that 
notice and public procedures thereon are impracticable, unneces-
sary, or contrary to the public interest," it does not have to utilize 
such procedures in its rulemaking. Furthermore, if the policies 
expressed in subsections (b)-(e) are presently sound respecting un-
excepted situations, they should be equally sound with respect to 
"public property, loans, grants, benefits and contracts." The reason 
and reduced in effectiveness if its rules were subjected to the mandatory notice and 
public procedure requirements." 
47. For example, the Veteran's Administration responded that elimination of the 
section 553(a) exclusions "would lead to heavier workloads within the agency and a 
resulting increase in cost, as well as delay in implementation of newly enacted laws 
with a resulting delay in awarding benefits thereunder." In addition, although the 
Department of Labor saw no substantial drawbacks to repeal of the exemption in 
section 553(a) it did note that it "would, of course, substantially increase the cost of 
Government." 
48. For example, the Office of Economic Opportunity responded that "the major 
disadvantage in a statute which would eliminate the exclusions now in 5 U.S.C. 553(a) 
is that it would require OEO to follow two sets of procedures, those of 5 U.S.C. 553, 
which would generally prove ineffective in reaching the poor, and those currently 
followed, particularly by CAP, which have proved effective and are constantly being 
made more effective." 
49. The Tennessee Valley Authority responded that "procedures for the formula-
tion of policies under the rulemaking requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553 would place TVA 
and its distributors in an adversary position where the tendency would be for each 
distributor or group of distributors to try to gain an advantage in the formulation 
of the policy rather than working with TV A and other distributors in a mutual effort 
to find the best possible solution to each problem as it arises." 
50. For example, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reported that 
with respect to some programs, "the authorizing statute provides for rulemaking 
procedures other than those provided by the AP A • • • ." 
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for this is that the previously noted objections to the application 
of subsections (b)-(e) to the classes now excepted by subsection (a) 
can also be leveled against the applicability of the former pro-
visions to rulemaking not presently excepted by subsection (a). 
Consequently, there are no persuasive arguments which preclude 
repeal of all exemptions contained in section 4(a) as they may 
apply to programs with a substantial impact on the poor. 
The exemptions contained in section 4(a) of the APA might, 
therefore, be amended to require federal agencies to follow the 
provisions of subsections (b)-(e) in all situations where their rule-
making has a substantial impact on the poor. A statutory change of 
this kind is somewhat broader than, but generally similar to, that 
contained in a recent bill introduced by Congressman Feighan 
of Ohio.51 Congressman Feighan's bill would authorize the Attorney 
General of the United States to lift the exemption contained in sec-
tion 4(a) whenever he deems that desirable to protect the interests 
of the poor. Once the Attorney General lifted the exemption as to a 
particular rulemaking situation because the "interests of persons of 
limited means ... make it appropriate," any "interested person," 
rich or poor, could presumably assert rights to participate under sub-
sections (b)-(e). As noted earlier, agencies have unlimited discretion 
to permit public participation in situations excepted by section 4(a), 
but they are not required to do so; the Feighan bill would only ex-
tend this same discretion to the Attorney General where he decides 
the interests of the poor require it. 
Some might argue that the Feighan bill, or a broader revision of 
section 4(a) expressly requiring federal agencies to follow the provi-
sions of subsections (b)-(e) for all rulemaking having a substantial im-
pact on the poor, raises serious fifth amendment due process ques-
tions of an equal protection nature. The argument is that statutory 
revisions of this sort give the poor an unfair and irrational advantage 
over all other Americans. The proposed modifications would require 
federal agencies to provide notice and an opportunity to participate 
in normally exempted situations where the poor would be benefited 
by such rights; but these modifications would not oblige agencies to 
provide these opportunities where they would only benefit the more 
affluent. However, this classification is rational because, unlike the 
poor, the American upper and middle classes have adequate alterna-
tive means for protecting their interests in rulemaking. 
51. H.R. 17974, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); see note 24 supra. 
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To protect their collective interests, the more affluent members 
of our society do not need formal notice of proposed rules and an 
official opportunity to present their views to the appropriate authori-
ties. After all, most official policy makers are middle-class persons 
who have had middle-class experiences and daily associations. Con-
sequently, those who are responsible for making administrative 
regulations are oriented toward the middle-class point of view and 
are generally conversant with the collective interests of that group. 
They are, therefore, likely to understand and protect the collective 
interests of the more affluent, even where such persons do not have a 
chance to represent their interests formally in rulemaking proceed-
ings vitally affecting them. In order to equalize the poor's position 
in rulemaking with that of better financed segments of society, 
the poor may need special guarantees to assure full consideration 
of their views. 
Modification of the section 4(a) exemptions along the lines sug-
gested above would assure that the poor and their representatives, 
including the people's counsel, would have a reliable means by which 
to discover and participate in proposed rulemaking of concern to 
them; they could simply watch the Federal Register. Such a change 
could probably be effected either by statute or by an executive order, 
since the President has the authority to command his subordinates 
to do that which they now have the discretion to do. Since a purely 
procedural requirement of this type would not seem to interfere with 
the substantive policy-making functions of the independent federal 
agencies, they may also be bound by such an order. 
However, there is a substantial evidence that section 4(a) needs 
a general legislative overhaul. Alteration or repeal of that provision 
has been proposed apart from any more specific consideration of its 
effect on the ability of poor people to represent their interests ade-
quately in the rulemaking process.52 Testimony adduced in the course 
of congressional hearings suggests the possible desirability of across-
the-board revisions of the section 4(a) exemptions.53 Consequently, 
it may be wise to leave the provision as it is pending further inquiry 
into the advisability of amending it generally. Instead of narrowly 
altering the provision at this time in order to solve the particular 
52. See, e.g., S. 163, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1964) (Comm. Revision); S. 518, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1967). 
53. Hearings on S. 1663 Before the Subcom. on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Hearings on 
S. 518 Before the Subcom. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
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problem under consideration, federal agencies should simply be 
urged, in strong terms, to follow the provisions of subsections (b )-
( e) for all rulemaking substantially affecting the poor. 
C. Special Notice and Hearing for the People's Counsel 
For the present purposes, another proposal can be made which 
would partly obviate the need to amend the current exemptions 
contained in section 4(a). All federal agencies contemplating the 
promulgation of rules substantially affecting the poor should be re-
quired to notify the people's counsel of the pendency of such rules 
and to give this advocate for the underprivileged an opportunity to 
present the views of the poor. Imposition of this type of duty on a 
federal agency is not unprecedented. For example, Budget Bureau 
Circular A-85, discussed previously,54 directs federal agencies to fol-
low specific procedures with respect to the development of rules and 
policies for federal assistance programs that include among their 
eligible recipients state or local governments or quasi-public agencies. 
Unless special circumstances preclude it, issuing agencies are re-
quired to provide the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations (ACIR) with a copy of all proposed regulations-usually 
not less than forty-five days prior to their intended promulgation. 
The ACIR is then under a duty to transmit that information to 
various state and local government associations which have, normally, 
three weeks in which to comment to the agencies on the proposed 
regulations or policies. Another similar obligation to provide special 
notice and opportunity to appear is imposed by statute on the 
Interstate Commerce Commission: 
Before hearing or disposing of any complaint (filed by any person 
other than the Secretary) with respect to rates, charges, tariffs, and 
practices relating to the transportation of farm products, the [Inter-
state Commerce] Commission shall cause the Secretary [of Agricul-
ture] to be notified, and, upon application by the Secretary, shall 
permit the Secretary to appear and be heard.55 
A similar requirement should now be adopted for all federal 
agencies with reference to their proposed promulgation of rules sub-
stantially affecting the economically underprivileged. If such a pro-
cedure were made mandatory, the present exceptions contained in 
section 4(a) would not seriously prejudice the ability of the poor to 
54. See page 523 supra. 
55. 7 U.S.C. § 129l(a) (1964). 
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have their views represented in the formulation of rules substantially 
affecting them. When it received notice of such contemplated rule• 
making, the people's counsel would disseminate that information to 
all interested poor people's organizations. After obtaining feedback 
from them, the people's advocate would affirmatively represent the 
views of the economically underprivileged to the relevant agency. 
The effective and economical operation of the people's counsel 
therefore makes it desirable to impose the following requirements 
on federal agencies: they must notify the poor's "official" group 
counsel of all proposed rulemaking substantially affecting poor per-
sons and give it an opportunity to communicate to appropriate of• 
ficials the views of the economically underprivileged with respect to 
those proposed rules. 
It is true, of course, that this limited requirement would not be 
as satisfactory a cure for the problem as an outright modification 
of section 4(a) in all cases where poor people's interests are con• 
cerned. A substitute provision of the kind suggested above would 
not assure notice of proposed rulemaking to anyone but the people's 
counsel and those informed by the people's counsel; and in such 
circumstances no one but the people's counsel would have a right 
to present formally the views of the poor with respect to those rules. 
However, pending general revision of section 4(a), this seems a de• 
sirable requirement and a minimally satisfactory substitute guaran• 
tee for present purposes. 
To ensure that the administrative process is not unreasonably 
burdened in some situations, an exception similar to that found 
in APA section 4(b)(B) should be engrafted onto the narrow require• 
ment discussed above. Federal agencies should be allowed to promul-
gate rules substantially affecting the poor without giving prior notice 
and an opportunity to be heard to the people's counsel "where the 
agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the :finding and a 
brief statement of the reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice 
and ... [an opportunity for the people's counsel to present its 
views prior to promulgation of the rules] are impracticable, unnec-
essary or contrary to the public interest." In cases of this sort, 
agencies should be required to notify the people's counsel, as soon 
as practicable, of any consumated rulemaking substantially affect-
ing the poor. Moreover, they should also be required to provide it 
an opportunity to present the views of the poor with respect to the 
desirability of amending or rescinding any such rules. This require-
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ment will at least facilitate a reconsideration of accomplished rule-
making in light of the views of the poor where presentation of their 
position is impractical prior to rulemaking. 
The specific requirements suggested here with respect to giving 
the people's counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard could 
be imposed by statute or executive order. The latter method might 
be as efficacious as the former in binding independent regulatory 
agencies, since the order would deal only with a matter of pro-
cedure and would not attempt to invade their substantive policy-
making functions. The ease with which such an order could impose 
or remove these requirements, or modify them as the need dictates, 
may also make it a more desirable tool for this purpose than a statute. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Any attempt to cure the poor's lack of representation in federal 
rulemaking substantially affecting their interests requires a number 
of remedies rather than a single one. Congress should institute 
procedures to facilitate and encourage greater self-initiated efforts by 
relevant administrative agencies to ascertain the views of the poor. 
Some body must also perform the functions of a clearinghouse 
coordinator in order to facilitate greater affirmative participation 
by the poor and their organizational representatives in rulemaking. 
To ensure consistent, affirmative representation of high quality 
for the collective interests of the poor, Congress should create a 
people's counsel with the responsibilities described above. To per-
form its function properly, the people's counsel must receive notice 
of contemplated rulemaking affecting the poor, and must have an 
opportunity to present poor people's views on the proposed rules 
to the relevant agencies. 
All of these measures in combination should-if properly ex-
ecuted in light of their purposes-provide an adequate remedy for 
the problem at hand. These recommendations are desirable because 
they will improve the administration of government. They will 
assure that the administrative decision makers in the federal 
establishment are better informed about the interests of the poor 
than at present. These proposals should also eliminate one source of 
unnecessary tension between the poor and the federal establish-
ment. They will provide procedures whereby the poor can get a 
fair hearing on the formulation of significant public policies affec-
ting them. The specific proposals made here will not create any sub-
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stantial negative impact on the rulemaking process. They will make 
important affirmative contributions to that process. Since the lack of 
representation for the poor in federal rulemaking is a critical prob-
lem, these proposals should be implemented as swiftly as possible. 
APPENDIX A 
Recommendations Suggested to the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United 
States on the Basis of the Above Study of 
Representation for the Poor in Federal 
Rulemaking. 
In this context the term "poor" re-
fers to that group of persons in our so-
ciety unable to secure adequate represen-
tation of its collective interests in federal 
rulemaking because its members lack the 
individual or organizational financial re-
sources to do so. 
The rulemaking referred to is that de-
fined by the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act § 2(c), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). 
I (a) Federal agencies should engage 
in more self-initiated affirmative efforts 
to ascertain directly from the poor their 
views with respect to rulemaking sub-
stantially affecting them. For this pur-
pose agencies should increase their use 
of existing procedures and should devise 
and utilize new procedures. 
(b) Where feasible and practicable 
agencies should do as many of the fol-
lowing as are necessary to assure that 
they are fully informed with respect to 
the relevant interests of the poor. 
(I) Agencies should make a special 
effort to assure that the poor are effec-
tively informed of all proposed rulemak-
ing substantially affecting them, and 
should provide opportunities for the poor 
to submit their views with respect to 
such rulemaking. 
APPENDIX B 
Recommendations Adopted December 
10 and 11, 1968, by the Administrative 
Conference of the United States With 
Respect to Representation of the Poor 
in Agency Rulemaking of Direct Conse-
quence to Them. 
(These are the only statements on this 
subject attributable to the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States.) 
A. AGENCY EFFORTS 
I. Federal agencies should engage more 
extensively in affirmative, self-initiated 
efforts to ascertain directly from the poor 
their views with respect to rulemaking 
that may affect them substantially. For 
this purpose, agencies should make strong 
efforts, by use of existing as well as 
newly devised procedures, to obtain in-
formation and opinion from those whose 
circumstances may not permit conven-
tional participation in rulemaking pro-
ceedings. The "rulemaking" referred to 
is that defined by the Administrative 
Procedure Act, § 2(c), 5 U.S.C. 551(4) and 
(5). 
2. Agencies should employ as many of 
the following procedures as are feasible, 
practicable, and necessary to assure their 
being fully informed concerning the rele-
vant interests of the poor: 
(a} Agencies should seek to inform 
the poor of all rulemaking pro-
posals that may affect them sub-
stantially and should provide op-
portunities for the poor to submit 
their views concerning these and 
related proposals. 
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(2) Agencies should hold formal pub-
lic hearings or informal conferences in 
close geographic proximity to the poor 
affected by contemplated agency rule-
making. 
(3) Agencies should specially invite 
individuals constituting a representative 
cross section of the poor to submit their 
views orally or in writing with respect to 
proposed regulations substantially affect-
ing the poor. 
(4) Agencies should conduct field sur-
veys among the poor to discover their 
attitudes with respect to particular gov-
ernment policy-making substantially af-
fecting them. 
(5) Agencies should use advisory com-
mittees made up of representatives of 
the poor as continuing consultants with 
respect to all programs having a substan-
tial effect on such persons. 
(6) Agencies should, when necessary to 
assure adequate representation for the 
poor, pay the personal expenses and wage 
losses incurred by poor individuals inci-
dent to their representation in agency 
rulemaking hearings of such people's in-
terests. Congress should clearly authorize 
federal agencies to make, in their discre-
tion, such payments. 
In deciding whether the use of any 
one or more of the above devices is feasi-
ble, practicable, or necessary in a given 
situation, agencies should resolve every 
uncertainty in favor of utilizing them; 
but their enumeration should not ex-
clude or discourage the development and 
use of other devices to achieve the same 
result. 
III (b) Federal agencies should follow 
the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(e) for 
all rulemaking with a substantial impact 
on the poor, even though some such rule-
(b) Agencies should hold formal pub-
lic hearings or informal confer-
ences in close geographic prox-
imity to the poor substantially 
~ffected by contemplated rulemak-
mg. 
(c) Agencies should take care to invite 
individuals constituting a repre-
sentative cross-section of the poor 
to submit their views orally or in 
writing as to proposed rules sub-
stantially affecting the poor. 
(d) Agencies should conduct field sur-
veys among the poor to discover 
their attitudes concerning partic-
ular government policy-making 
substantially affecting them. 
(e) Agencies should use advisory com-
mittees made up of reeresentatives 
of the poor as continuing counsul-
tants for all programs having a 
substantial effect on such persons. 
(f) When necessary to assure adequate 
representation for the poor, agen-
cies should pay the personal ex-
penses and wage losses incurred 
by individuals incident to their 
participation in rulemaking hear• 
ings. Congress should support 
agency requests for funds and for 
authority, where none exists, to 
make discretionary payments for 
this purpose. Agencies already au-
thorized to make such payments 
in whole or in part should use 
their existing authority and should 
allocate funds accordingly. 
In deciding whether the use of any 
one or more of the above devices is feas-
ible, practicable, or necessary in a given 
situation, agencies should resolve doubts 
in favor of utilizing them; but their enu-
meration should not exclude or discour-
age the development and use of other 
devices to achieve the same result. 
In carrying out paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
this Recommendation, agencies should 
consult with and coordinate their efforts 
with other federal agencies having re-
sponsibilities in this area and should 
make maximum feasible use of the facili-
ties of such other agencies for communi-
cating with and obtaining expressions of 
the views of the poor. 
3. Agencies should be encouraged in 
appropriate circumstances to determine 
that the exemptions in 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2) 
should not be applied with respect to 
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making is presently excepted from those 
provisions by the exemptions contained 
in § 553(a). 
II (a) (1) An organization should be 
created to employ a staff to act as "peo-
ple's counsel." The people's counsel should 
represent the collective interests of the 
poor as a class in all federal administra-
tive rulemaking substantially affecting 
them. 
(2) The people's counsel should be 
charged with assuring that the views of 
significant separable minority interests 
among the poor are represented in that 
process. 
(3) The people's counsel should be re-
quired to act as an information clearing-
house, disseminating intelligence respect-
ing rulemaking substantially affecting the 
poor to all interested poor people's or-
ganizations. 
(4) The people's counsel should be au-
thorized to intervene in its own name to 
represent the interests of the poor in 
federal agency adjudicative proceedings 
substantially affecting those persons. 
(5) The people's counsel should be 
empowered to seek judicial review of fed-
eral agency rules in its own name, and 
on its own motion, as a representative of 
the poor. This recommendation is not 
intended to alter the kinds of agency 
action amenable to judicial review or the 
scope of that review. 
(6) As an incident to its main respon-
sibilities the people's counsel should be 
empowered to recommend to Congress or 
the President, or to both, such legislation 
or other action as it deems appropriate 
to solve problems of the poor. 
(b) (1) To pro\ide for the perfor-
mance of the functions outlined in rec-
ommendation II (a) Congress should cre-
ate a new single-purpose people's counsel 
corporation modeled on the Corporation 
for Public Broadcasting (47 U.S.C. § 396 
et seq.). 
rulemaking which may have a substan-
tial impact on the poor. 
B. PEOPLE'S COUNSEL 
4. (a) An organization should be au-
thorized by statute to employ a staff to 
act as "People's Counsel.'' The People's 
Counsel should represent the interests of 
the poor in all federal administrative 
rulemaking substantially affecting the 
poor. 
(b) The People's Counsel should be 
charged with assuring that the views of 
significant separable minority interests 
among the poor are represented in such 
federal administrative rulemaking. 
(c) The People's Counsel should be 
required to disseminate to all interested 
poor people's organizations pertinent in-
formation concerning rulemaking sub-
stantially affecting the poor. 
(d) The People's Counsel should be 
authorized to participate suitably in its 
own name to represent the interests of 
the poor in any federal agency proceed-
ings in which the poor have a substan-
tial interest. 
(e) The People's Counsel should be 
authorized to provide representation for 
organizations and groups of the poor who 
seek judicial review of administrative 
action substantially affecting their in-
terests. This recommendation is not to 
alter the kinds of agency action amena-
ble to judicial review, the requirements 
of standing to seek review, or the scope 
of that review. 
(f) As an incident to its main respon-
sibilities the People's Counsel should be 
empowered to recommend to Congress or 
the President or to both such legislation 
or other action as it deems appropriate 
to correct deficiencies in or otherwise im-
prove federal programs having a substan-
tial impact on the poor. 
5. (a) Congress should provide for an 
appropriate body to perform the func-
tions outlined in Section 4. Deserving of 
consideration as such body would be a 
new single purpose corporation, to be 
created by Congress, modeled on the Cor-
poration for Public Broadcasting, Pub. 
Law 90-129, 81 Stat. 368 (1967), 47 U.S.C. 
(Supp. III) 396, and to be known as 
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(2) The people's counsel corporation 
should be made tax exempt and autho-
rized to accept grants of private funds. 
Gifts to the corporation also should be 
made deductible as charitable contribu-
tions for federal income tax purposes. 
(3) Federal financing of the people's 
counsel corporation should be made 
available to the extent necessary to as-
sure its effective operation. 
(4) The governing board of the peo-
ple's counsel corporation should be con-
stituted to give the poor meaningful 
representation thereon. It should also be 
constituted to ensure close communica-
tions and an identity of viewpoint be-
tween the poor and the people's coun-
sel provided to represent their collective 
interests. 
III (a) An executive order should re-
quire all federal agencies to notify the 
people's counsel of any rules they pro-
pose to promulgate that would have a 
substantial impact on the poor. They 
should also be required by that execu-
tive order to give the people's counsel 
an opportunity to present the views of 
the poor with respect to such proposed 
rules. Exceptions to these obligations 
should be permitted only "when the 
agency for good cause finds (and incor-
porates the finding and a brief state-
ment of the reasons therefor in the rules 
issued) that [such] notice and ••• [an 
opportunity for the people's counsel to 
present its views] thereon are impractic-
able, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). 
In these exceptional cases agencies 
should be required to notify the peo-
ple's counsel, as soon as practicable, of 
any consummated rulemaking substan-
tially affecting the poor, and required to 
give that counsel, as soon as practicable, 
an opportunity to communicate to the 
agency its views with respect to the de-
sirability of amending or rescinding any 
such consummated rulemaking. 
the People's Counsel Corporation. In 
the event this form of organization is 
adopted, the following considerations 
should apply: 
(1) The People's Counsel Corporation 
should be made tax exempt and autho-
rized to accept grants of private funds. 
Gifts to the Corporation should be made 
deductible as charitable contributions for 
federal income tax purposes. 
(2) Federal financing of the Corpora-
tion should be made available to the 
extent necessary to assure its effective 
operation. 
(3) The governing board of the Peo-
ple's Counsel Corporation should be 
constituted to give the poor meaningful 
representation thereon. Such body should 
be constituted to ensure close communi-
cation with the poor and effective 
representation of the viewpoints of the 
poor. 
6. All Federal agencies should be re-
quired by Executive order to notify the 
People's Counsel of all proposed rules 
which would have a substantial impact 
on the poor. Agencies also should be re-
quired by that Executive order to give 
the People's Counsel an opportunity to 
present the views of the poor with re-
spect to such proposed rules. Exceptions 
to these obligations should be permitted 
only "when the agency for good cause 
finds (and incorporates the finding and 
a brief statement of reasons therefor in 
the rules issued) that [such] notice and 
• . • [an opportunity for the People's 
Counsel to present its views] are im-
practicable, unnecessary, or contrary to 
the public interest." (See 5 U.S.C. 
553(b)(B).) In these exceptional cases, 
agencies should be required to notify the 
People's Counsel as soon as practicable 
of any consummated rulemaking sub-
stantially affecting the poor, and should 
be required to give the Counsel as soon 
as practicable an opportunity to com-
municate to the agency its views con-
cerning the desirability of further action 
with respect to such rulemaking. 
·without prejudice to creating or em-
powering any other appropriate body to 
perform the general functions outlined 
in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, any special 
provision therefor should be so struc-
tured as to take maximum advantage of 
the capabilities in this field of non-gov-
ernment organizations, and of other 
public bodies, including notably the Of-
fice of Economic Opportunity. 
